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State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation:
Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit
BARBARA ANN ATWOOD*
Under the mandate of section 1738 of title 28 of the United States Code,1
state judicial proceedings must be given "the same full faith and credit"
in the federal courts as they would receive in the courts of the rendering
state.2 Although this statutory expression of intersystem comity has been
a part of our law since shortly after the adoption of the Constitution,3
the statute frequently has been overlooked or disregarded by the federal
courts when called upon to assess the preclusive effects of a prior state
court determination or decree.4 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the vitality of section 1738 in a pair of decisions dealing with the res
judicata5 effects of state court findings on later federal court litigation.
J.D. 1976, University of Arizona; B.A. 1969, Mary Baldwin College. Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author is grateful for the Research
Enabling Grant provided by the University of Houston for the preparation of this article.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
2 The statute provides in part:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory
or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attesta-
tion of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with
a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authen-
ticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the Courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
3 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122.
1 See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. The question of the preclusive effect
of state court proceedings in later federal court litigation was not addressed in the original
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1934). The American Law Institute finally adopted a provision
on that question in the new Restatement. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 86
(1982) provides:
A valid and final judgment of a state court has the same effects under the
rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in a federal court that the judg-
ment has by the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered, except
that:
(1) An adjudication of a claim in a state court does not preclude litigation
in a federal court of a related federal claim based on the same transaction
if the federal claim arises under a scheme of federal remedies which con-
templates that the federal claim may be asserted notwithstanding the adjudica-
tion in state court; and
(2) A determination of an issue by a state court does not preclude relitiga-
tion of that issue in federal court if gccording preclusive effect to the deter-
mination would be incompatible with a scheme of federal remedies which con-
templates that the federal court may make an independent determination of
the issue in question.
The term "res judicata" will be used in this article to denote both major doctrines
of the law of prior adjudication: first, claim preclusion, or merger and bar, which refers
to the effect of a judgment in extinguishing the underlying claim; and second, issue preclu-
sion , or collateral estoppel, which refers to the effect of a prior determination of an issue
in later litigation. See infra notes 18-34 and accompanying text. The newer terminology
of "preclusion" has been adopted by the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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In Allen v. McCurry6 the Court held that a state court defendant who
unsuccessfully raised a fourth amendment claim in the course of his
criminal trial may be precluded from relitigating the constitutional issue
in a later damages action in federal court under the 1871 Civil Rights
Act.' In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.," the Court reached a
similar conclusion with regard to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'
A complainant who unsuccessfully sought review in state court of an
adverse administrative finding regarding an employment discrimination
claim was precluded from thereafter seeking relief for the same conduct
under Title VII in federal court. In each case the Court concluded that
the pertinent civil rights statute did not override the federal court's obliga-
tion to accord full faith and credit to the state court proceeding.
The decisions in Allen and Kremer were the predictable products of
a Court which has frequently displayed concern for the protection of state
sovereignty against unwarranted federal interference. 10 In each decision
the Court emphasized that full recognition of state judicial proceedings
by the federal courts was an essential component of federalism and comity.
On the other hand, the decisions did not answer important questions
relating to full faith and credit which directly implicate those same values
of federalism. In particular, the Court has not yet defined the cir-
cumstances in which a party in federal court may be barred from litigating
a claim which the party could have raised, but did not raise, in a prior
OF JUDGMENTS 1-15 (1982) (ch. 1), but the courts seem reluctant to let loose of the traditional
distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979). On the evolution of res judicata terminology in general,
see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 4402 (1982).
' 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
7 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976).
102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982).
42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. I1 1979).
10 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court held that principles of federalism,
comity, and equitable restraint barred a federal injunctive challenge to a pending state
criminal proceeding where the federal plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise his
constitutional challenge in the state prosecution. More recent cases have extended the
Younger doctrine beyond its original context to bar federal interference with various state
civil proceedings. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
102 S. Ct. 2515 (1982) (attorney disciplinary proceedings; Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)
(proceedings to terminate parental rights); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (contempt
proceedings). In addition, the Court has shown a concern for the protection of state
sovereignty in a variety of non-Younger cases. See, e.g., Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982) (federal habeas challenge to state's ter-
mination of parental rights barred on jurisdictional grounds); Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981) (federal damages action against state taxing scheme
barred on comity grounds and policy of non-interference underlying Tax Injunction Act);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (federal habeas relief for state prisoner barred
on grounds of procedural default); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(federal regulation of state governmental employment barred on apparent tenth amend-
ment grounds); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (federal monetary award against
state barred on eleventh amendment grounds).
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state court action." This question, to which the lower federal courts have
given conflicting answers in the civil rights context, 2 can be expected
to arise with increasing frequency precisely because of the Allen and
Kremer holdings. Currently, in light of Allen and'Kremer, a litigant in
a state court who wishes to obtain a full hearing in federal court on his
or her federal claim may refrain from asserting the claim in the state
court proceeding in order to avoid a later plea of res judicata, including
possible issue preclusion. A defendant in a state criminal action or civil
enforcement proceeding may be particularly likely to follow such a
strategy if the state court is perceived as less sensitive to federal con-
stitutional claims and the defendant is more concerned with obtaining
a favorable decision of future rights than with avoiding punishment in
the state prosecution.
Full faith and credit issues involving a previously unlitigated federal
claim are likewise posed where successive actions, based on the same
facts, are brought in state and federal court and where the federal action
is founded on a statute within exclusive federal court jurisdiction. With
" As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Haring v. Prosise, 103 S.
Ct. 2368 (1983), a case involving one of the full faith and credit issues addressed here. The
Court's holding and reasoning are consistent with the conclusions of this article. In Haring
the Court unanimously ruled that a state court criminal defendant who had entered a plea
of guilty in the criminal proceeding was not barred by full faith and credit from later asserting
a fourth amendment claim under § 1983 in federal court against the investigating officers.
The Court reasoned that because the courts of the rendering state would not have precluded
the fourth amendment claim under prevailing res judicata doctrine, "the issue was not
foreclosed under 28 U.S.C. § 1738" in federal court. Id. at 2375. In addition, the Court refused
to adopt a special rule of preclusion which would have barred the 5 1983 claim merely
because the claimant had had the opportunity to raise the issue in the criminal case. Id.
at 2377. The Court rejected arguments that the failure to assert the fourth amendment
objection should be deemed either an admission of the legality of the search or a waiver
of the constitutional claim. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in the same case is discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 164-67.
12 Although a majority of the circuits apply ordinary rules of claim preclusion to con-
stitutional claims, see, e.g., Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982); Castorr v.
Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982); Gallagher v. Frye,
631 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1980); Hirrill v. Merriweather, 629 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1980); Ramirez
Plugez v. Cole, 571 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1978); Jennings v. Caddo Parrish School Bd., 531 F.2d
1331 (5th Cir. 1976); Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975); Harl v. City of LaSalle, 506 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
679 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1982), courts in the Second and Third Circuits have recognized an
exception to res judicata for previously unlitigated constitutional claims, see Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (dicta), aff'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982); New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v.
Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Ornstein v. Regan, 574 F.2d
115 (2d Cir. 1978); Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1977); Lombard v. Board of
Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975); Di Rosa v. Dodd, 514
F. Supp. 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dicta). But see Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d
166 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (42 U.S.C. 5 1981 (1976) is governed by ordinary res judicata
after state court proceeding on same claim). The Court recently granted certiorari in a
case which raises the question of the applicability of claim preclusion to a S 1983 claim




little real guidance from the Supreme Court, 3 the lower courts have
displayed confusion as to the impact of a grant of exclusive jurisdiction
on the full faith and credit requirement. 4 This article will explore these
issues of state-to-federal preclusion, with major emphasis on the question
of whether and to what extent a federal court may entertain a federal
claim which could have been but was not actually litigated in a prior state
court proceeding. 5
Part One of this article provides a brief summary of res judicata doc-
trine, a background discussion of full faith and credit, and a detailed review
of the Allen and-Krener decisions. Part Two examines the various factual
situations in which the question of the previously unlitigated federal claim
can arise. The analysis in Part Two will focus on the practical scope of,
and potential exceptions to, the full faith and credit mandate.
The thesis here is that the full faith and credit mandate should be
applied consistently with its fundamental purpose-to ensure the
conclusiveness and finality of state court proceedings in every court within
our federal scheme. Accordingly, absent a statutory exception, the full
faith and credit requirement does not permit the belated assertion of a
federal claim in federal court where the object of the suit is to defeat
an earlier state court judgment or to contradict an earlier state court
determination. On the other hand, if finality and consistency are not
threatened and traditional res judicata doctrines do not bar the assertion
of a particular claim or issue, then the full faith and credit mandate should
be deemed similarly inapplicable. Thus, so long as the object of the federal
action is not to nullify the state court proceeding, neither res judicata
"s But cf. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), discussed infra at
note 225; Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979), discussed infra at notes 72-79 and accom-
panying text; Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, 279 U.S. 388 (1929), discussed infra at notes
209-13 and accompanying text.
14 See generally, 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER supra note 5, S 4470. Specific
cases involving full faith and credit in the exclusive jurisdiction context are discussed in-
fra at notes 203-32 and accompanying text.
"S This article is concerned with the federal courts' obligation to accord full faith and
credit to a prior state court proceeding in the context of federal question jurisdiction, where
there is a recognized federal interest in providing a federal forum for particular categories
of claims. The article will not address the operation of full faith and credit in a subsequent
federal action based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Where the underlying claim
in the federal action is founded on state law, federal substantive policy would not be
implicated in the full faith and credit question. Federal law, nevertheless, would play a
role in the diversity court: the prior judgment would have to satisfy minimal due process
standards to be entitled to recognition, and, assuming that the constitutional standard is
met, S 1738 would require the federal court to apply the res judicata law of the rendering
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. S 1738 (1976). For an analysis of the choice of law considerations
governing state-to-federal preclusion in a diversity context, see Degnan, Federalized Res
Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741,750-55 (1976); Vestal, Res Judicata / Preclusion by Judgment: The
Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723 (1968). For a particularly insightful
judicial treatment of the issue, see J. Aron & Co. v. Service Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp.
428 (D. Md. 1981).
[Vol. 58:59
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
nor full faith and credit prevents a state court defendant from withholding
a potential federal defense and then litigating it as an affirmative claim
for relief in a later federal action.
A related thesis concerns the question of statutory exceptions to full
faith and credit. It will be argued here16 that statutes which grant con-
current jurisdiction to state and federal courts cannot, by definition, create
exceptions to the full faith and credit mandate. In such statutes, Congress
has indicated that either forum is competent to reach a final resolution
of the statutory claims. This fundamental premise of concurrent jurisdic-
tion has been ignored by those courts which have recognized an automatic
exception under section 1738 for civil rights claims which might have been
but were not asserted in prior state court proceedings.17 Exclusive jurisdic-
tion statutes, in contrast, should be presumed to establish a limited
exception under section 1738 for claim preclusion. The finality of the state
court judgment may at times be disturbed, but that relaxation of full faith
and credit is required by Congress' edict that certain categories of claims
be finally resolved only in the federal courts.
RES JUDICATA, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT,
AND THE ALLEN AND KREMER DECISIONS
General Principles of Preclusion
Courts have developed the doctrines of res judicatall in order to en-
sure the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdiction.19 The
basic principle of res judicata reflects a paradox: finality in judicial deci-
sions is desirable not because courts are infallible but because they are
fallible.0 The possibility that different courts will reach different conclu-
sions on the same issue renders necessary a "convention of finality";
without such a convention, legal disputes would continue indefinitely in
successive actions. By ensuring the finality of decisions, res judicata en-
courages reliance on adjudication, prevents repetitive and unnecessary
'6 See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
1' Res judicata in federal and state courts is almost entirely a product of common law.
Very few federal statutes prescribe the effect of particular judgments and none provides
detailed rules on such matters as privity and mutuality. See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 19-21; A. VESTEL, RES JUDICATAIPRECLUSION 504
(1969).
19 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS 10-11 (1982) (ch. 1); see also Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 315 (1957) ("the
first lesson one must learn on the subject of res judicata is that judicial findings must
not be confused with absolute truth"); cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,




litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes." Individual ap-
plications of res judicata may not serve all of the identified purposes.
It has been suggested that a plea of res judicata is at its weakest where
the major purpose served is that of judicial economy, and at its strongest
where it operates to protect the integrity of an earlier judgment.' This
argument has particular force in an intersystem context: the courts of
one system have little interest in ensuring judicial economy in another
system, but each system has a strong interest in reciprocal recognition
of judgments.
Within the broad category of res judicata are contained the separate
doctrines of issue preclusion and claim preclusion. The classic formula-
tion of the distinction was provided by Justice Field:
[T]he judgment, if rendered upon the merits .... is a finality as to
the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose
.... Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again
be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law
upon any ground whatever.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates
as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.'
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues which
have been actually and necessarily determined in a prior proceeding,
whether or not the same claim or cause of action is involved.24 The doc-
trine of claim preclusion, or merger and bar,' on the other hand, prevents
litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery on the same claim
that was previously available to the parties, regardless of whether the
2 E.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131
(1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
2 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, S 4403, at 12-13; Cleary, Res Judicata
Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 348-49 (1948).
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877).
"' See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS SS 27-29 (1982).
The term "merger" is used to describe the effect of a judgment in a plaintiff's favor.
The judgment is said to extinguish the entire claim and "merge" it in the judgment, thereby
limiting the plaintiff's right regarding the claim to an action to enforce the judgment. "Bar"
is used to describe the effect of a judgment for a defendant. Such a judgment is said to
extinguish the entire claim, thereby precluding the plaintiff from again suing on the same
claim. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE S 11.3, at 533 (2d ed. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18, 19 (1982). Professsor Martin has suggested that
the distinction between merger and bar should not be based on whether the plaintiff or
the defendant was the victor in the earlier proceeding. He proposes an alternative test
based on the underlying justifications: merger occurs when a party should have presented
a matter in the first action, and bar occurs when allowing a party to relitigate a matter
might produce inconsistent results. Martin, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: An Over-
vimew, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 407 (1981).
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claim or defense was asserted or determined in the prior proceeding. A
related concept, variously referred to as "defendant preclusion"' or the
"common law compulsory counterclaim,"27 holds that a claim which could
have been raised as a counterclaim in a prior action will be barred if the
successful prosecution of the later action would nullify the initial
judgment.' In addition, the adoption of explicit compulsory counterclaim
rules in many jurisdictions has correspondingly broadened the scope of
claim preclusion.' Generally, the failure to assert a statutory compulsory
counterclaim is deemed to preclude the assertion of that claim in a later
action." That principle of preclusion is typically treated by the courts
as a component of res judicata.3
The scope of claim preclusion is largely regulated through the defini-
tion of "claim" or "cause of action"; different jurisdictions have developed
varying approaches.' The determination of whether two actions are based
on the same claim or cause of action is never simple but is particularly
difficult in an intersystem context where the second court's definition
of "claim" may diverge markedly from that of the rendering court. Never-
theless, where the full faith and credit mandate applies, the second court
must adhere to the rendering court's law of res judicata and its defini-
tion of "claim."'
See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra, note 5, § 4414.
E.g., Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 966 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22, at 193-94 (1982).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 (1982).
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a); GA. CODE § 81A-113(a) (1978).
11 See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 79, at 390 (3d ed. 1976); Kennedy,
Counterclaims Under Federal Rule 13, 11 Hous. L. REV. 255, 259.60 (1974).
31 See, e.g., Texas Gulf Citrus & Cattle Co. v. Kelley, 591 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1979); Cleckner
v. Republic Van & Storage Co., 556 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1977). The difference between treating
compulsory counterclaim rules as part of res judicata and as simply a statutory directive
may be significant in an intersystem context. If a court views another system's compulsory
counterclaim rule purely as a statutory directive serving primarily local interests of judicial
economy, the court may not find the rule's operation to be entitled to full faith and credit.
See infra note 147.
1 The traditional formulation limited a claim or cause of action to the violation of a
single right by a single wrong. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927); see
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 25, at § 11.8; Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause ofAc-
tion for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 OR. L. REV. 319 (1942). Other more
pragmatic formulations look to a similarity of facts, issues, and evidence between the first
and second actions. The new Restatement of Judgments has endorsed the "transactiona'
test, defining a claim to embrace all the remedial rights of the plaintiff against the defen-
dant arising out of the relevant transaction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 24 (1982).
In a picturesque description of the standards for delimiting res judicata, Professor Cleary
observed:
When we come to the second part of the rule [of res judicata], dealing with
what might have been litigated in the former action .... we leave the workaday
world and enter into a wondrous realm of words, where results are obtained
not by grubbing out facts but by the application of incantations which change
pumpkins into coaches and one man's property into another's. The incanta-
tions are the various definitions of what constitutes a cause of action.
Cleary, supra note 22, at 343.
3 See infra note 54.
1982]
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The "might have been litigated" aspect of claim preclusion, upon which
this article will focus, has been referred to by one court as the "[D]raco-
nian formulation of the rule of res judicata." The issue can arise in various
contexts. Where the federal court plaintiff was a plaintiff in state court
in an action against the same party relating to the same incident, the
plaintiffs failure to assert the federal claim in state court may preclude
its later assertion in federal court under the doctrine of merger or bar.
Similarly, the federal claim may be blocked where the federal court plain-
tiff was a defendant in state court and failed to assert a particular federal
defense or counterclaim. Finally, the federal plaintiff may have been a
state criminal defendant who withheld a particular federal defense in the
criminal proceeding and then asserts the federal contention as a basis
for affirmative relief in federal court. Each permutation implicates
separate policies of res judicata and, concomitantly, full faith and credit.
Full Faith and Credit
Although the history of the adoption of the full faith and credit clause'
and implementing statute is sparse,38 it is apparent that the clause was
included in the Constitution to further the sense of federation among the
states.' The primary purpose of the clause, insofar as it concerned judicial
' Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1978).
" U.S. CONST., art. IV, S 1. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
' The full faith and credit clause was mentioned only a few times in the constitutional
debates and then without extended discussion. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 135, 174, 188, 445, 447-48, 483-86, 487-89 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
RECORDS]. The implementing statute was passed without debate. See Reese & Johnson, The
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153,153-55 (1949). As adopted
in 1790, the Act required that a state judgment be accorded "such faith and credit" as
it would have "by law or usage in the courts of the state" in which it was rendered. See
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122. Congress reenacted the statute in 1804 and added
a provision on authentication of judicial records. Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat.
298. The statute was not amended again until 1948 when Congress, among other changes,
substituted the words "the same full faith and credit" for the original language of "such
faith and credit." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 464, 62 Stat 947. Apparently no substantive
change was intended by the new phraseology. Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 523 n.64 (1981); Vestal, supra
note 15, at 1734 n.44. For a history of the full faith and credit clause and statute, see Costigan,
The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constitution and
a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of That Section and of Federal Legislation, 4
COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1904); Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts,
56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957); Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History,
39 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1944).
" Prior to the Continental Congress, a few colonies, in response to the problem of the
fleeing judgment debtor, enacted legislation which provided for reciprocal recognition of
judgments from the courts of other colonies. See Radin, supra note 36, at 17-18; Reese
& Johnson, supra note 36, at 154. The colonists' experience led to the inclusion of a full
[Vol. 58:59
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proceedings, was to ensure that a judgment in one state would be con-
clusive of the merits and therefore enforceable in all other states. 8 Sec-
tion 1738,11 unlike its originating clause in the Constitution, imposes the
full faith and credit obligation on federal as well as state courts." Indeed,
the Supreme Court has stated that the specific purpose of the statute
was "to insure that federal courts, not included within the constitutional
provision, would be bound by state judgments.""' That the statute was
enacted almost contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution
suggests that the full faith and credit clause was understood by its framers
to implicitly grant authority to Congress to prescribe the effect of state
court judgments in federal court."
The statutory rather than constitutional nature of the full faith and
credit obligation on the federal courts has two implications. First, the
authority of the federal courts to recognize exceptions to, or modifica-
tions of, the statutory mandate is arguably broader than would be the
corresponding authority under a constitutional mandate.4 At the least,
the federal courts cannot be held to more rigid standards under section
1738 than are the state courts under the dual regulation of the statute
and the Constitution.4  Thus, the Supreme Court's recognition of excep-
tions to full faith and credit in the state-to-state context45 would seem
faith and credit provision in the Articles of Confederation: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each in these States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts
and magistrates of every other State." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV. The absence
in the Articles of Confederation of a clause authorizing congressional implementation was
viewed as a significant weakness by the drafters of the constitutional provision. THE
FEDERALIST No. 42, at 293 (J. Madison) (Tudor ed. 1947); 2 RECORDS, supra note 36, at 488.
During the constitutional debates, the meaning of full faith and credit was said to
be "that Judgments in one state should be the ground of actions in other States." 2
RECORDS, supra note 36, 447.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
" Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938) ("The Act extended the rule of the Constitution
to all courts, Federal as well as State."). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S
86 comment c (1982) ("It is probable that, given the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution, the rule [of state-to-federal preclusion] would be the same independent of
the statute ....").
Although neither the constitutional clause nor the statute speaks to the effect of federal
court judgments in later state court proceedings, the Supreme Court has consistently
assumed that state courts are under an equal obligation to give full res judicata effect
to federal court judgments. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938); Embry v.
Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1882). For a survey and critique of the relevant case law, see
Degnan, supra note 15, at 744-49.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,'102 S. Ct. 1883, 1898 n.24 (1982).
12 Degnan, supra note 15, at 744. Congressional authority under article III of the
Constitution would seem to provide an additional source of power for the inclusion of the
federal courts in § 1738.
,3 See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, S 4469, at 662-63.
" Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889 n.24 (1982) (§ 1738 is subject
to no more restriction than the full faith and credit clause).
"' See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(full faith and credit does not require state to deny supplemental award under workmen's
compensation laws to individual who previously recovered award designated as exclusive
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equally applicable to the state-to-federal context. Second, it is undisputed
that Congress may legislatively override section 1738, although a con-
gressional intent to do so will not be lightly inferred." In contrast,
Congress' power to override the constitutional full faith and credit com-
mand is subject to question."1
It has long been settled that the full faith and credit statute requires
the federal courts to look to the res judicata law of the state of rendition
to determine the effect of a state court judgment. In Mills v. Duryee,8
the first case in which the Supreme Court construed the statute, Frances
Scott Key argued that the statutory reference to "faith and credit"
referred only to the effect of a judgment record as evidence and did not
require that the judgment be treated as conclusive of the underlying debt.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Story, rejected Key's
contention and established the basic rule for full faith and credit to
judgments:
The act declares that the record duly authenticated shall have such
faith and credit as it has in the state Court from whence it is taken.
If in such Court it has the faith and credit of . . . record cuidence,
it must have the same faith and credit in every other Court ....
It remains only then to inquire in every case what is the effect
of a judgment in the state where it is rendered.
[W]e can perceive no rational interpretation of the act of Congress,
unless it declares a judgment conclusive when a Court of the particular
state where it is rendered would pronounce the same decision. 9
Thus, the full faith and credit directive, by protecting the conclusiveness
of judgments in an intersystem context, federalizes the doctrines of res
judicata.5
The statutory command of section 1738 has been construed to
remedy in sister state); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839) (state may apply
its own statute of limitations to deny enforcement of sister state judgment that is still
enforceable in rendering state). See generally Reese & Johnson, supra note 36.
" Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1890 (1982). The prime example of
a congressional repeal of § 1738 is the provision in the federal habeas corpus statute
prescribing the weight to be given to state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)
(1976). See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272-73 n.18 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(Stevens, J.).
" 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
" Id. at 484-85. The Mills principle was described five years later by Chief Justice Marshall
as requiring that a state court judgment be given "the same credit, validity, and effect,
in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced."
Hampton v. M'Connell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 236-37 (1818). Accord M'Elmoyle v. Cohen,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 326 (1839).
' See, e.g., Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar., 102 S. Ct. 1357, 1360 (1982) (full faith and credit is crucial to cooperative functioning
of federal system). Professor Degnan was the first commentator to recognize and articulate
a coherent theory of "federalized res judicata." See Degnan, supra note 15.
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incorporate both issue preclusion and claim preclusion.5' Although it has
been suggested that issue preclusion may operate with.less force than
does claim preclusion under section 1738,11 the cases do not support such
a distinction.' Indeed, the bar against relitigation of determined issues
implements the core values of res judicata and full faith and credit: finality
and consistency of judicial determinations. Moreover, the drafters of the
constitutional clause and the implementing statute required that full faith
and credit be given to "judicial records and proceedings." The choice of
words arguably evinces a desire that judicial findings as well as decrees
receive intersystem recognition. In any event, the decisions in Allen and
Kremer establish that issue preclusion is a fundamental component of sec-
tion 1738.-
, See cases cited in 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, S 4469, at
669-72.
See Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 389
(1963); Torke, Res Judicata in Federal Civil Rights Actions Following State Litigation, 9
IND. L. REV. 543, 575 (1976); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, S 4467, at
641-44; cf. Williams v. Ocean Transp. Lines, 425 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (3d Cir. 1970) (collateral
estoppel, to extent it is designed primarily to prevent burdensome relitigation, may not
rest on same policies as full faith and credit and therefore may not be binding in state-to-
federal preclusion context); In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 427 F. Supp. 1211,
1219 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (federal court is not necessarily bound by rendering state's interpreta-
tion of collateral estoppel).
W See, e.g., Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 407 (1952) (intended function of full faith and
credit is to avoid relitigation in other states of adjudicated issues).
I There is some dispute over whether the federal courts under § 1738 may accord a
greater preclusive effect to state court judgments than would the courts of the rendering
state. See, e.g., Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1325-26 (5th Cir. 1981). The question turns
on whether "the same full faith and credit" prescribes both a minimum and a maximum
level of recognition due to foreign judgments. For example, if the rendering state follows
the mutuality of estoppel rule, a federal court must determine whether it is bound to apply
the state's rule or whether it may apply the more liberal federal doctrine and allow issue
preclusion to be asserted by one who was not a party to the earlier suit. The question
can also arise in the context of claim preclusion. If the federal court's definition of "claim"
for purposes of merger and bar is broader than that followed by the state, the federal
court may be inclined to apply the federal definition.
The issue has received considerable scholarly attention, primarily from an interstate
perspective, and the commentators are not in agreement. See Casad, supra note 36, at 517-28
(due process rather than full faith and credit limits court's power to give greater preclusive
effect to foreign judgment than would rendering court); Degnan, supra note 15, at 750-55
(§ 1738 requires that all judgments be given same effect as they would have in rendering
court); Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflict of Laws,
44 TENN. L. REV. 927,930,948 (1977) (although full faith and credit requires that all judgments
be given same effect as they would have in rendering court, full faith and credit does not
govern question of who may enforce judgment). The Supreme Court has never squarely
ruled on the question, and its dicta have been ambiguous. Compare Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (full faith and credit doctrine requires sister states to give to one another's
judgments "at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded" in render-
ing state) with Board of Pub. Works v. Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521, 529 (1873)
("No greater effect can be given to any judgment of a court of one State in another State
than is given to it in the State where rendered. Any other rule would contravene the
policy of the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States on that subject.").
For both theoretical and practical reasons, the better approach would seem to be that
the full faith and credit mandate prohibits a court from giving greater preclusive effect
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The intersystem operation of claim preclusion, under the mandate of
full faith and credit, was made clear in American Surety Co. v. Baldwin.0
The Court there invoked the full faith and credit statute to prevent a
federal court from enjoining the enforcement of a state court judgment
where the federal plaintiff had previously sought relief from judgment
in state court.5 Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous Court, explained
that the plaintiff could have invoked the federal remedy without first
pursuing that provided by state procedures, ' but that once the plaintiff
invoked the state remedy and pursued it to final judgment, the judgment
was binding. Noting that the full faith and credit directive applied to state
court proceedings drawn into question in an independent action in federal
court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
Having invoked the state procedure which afforded the opportunity
of raising the issue of lack of notice, the [plaintiff] cannot utilize the
same issue as a basis for relief in the federal court. Federal claims
are not to be prosecuted piecemeal in state and federal courts, whether
the attempt to do so springs from a failure seasonably to adduce
to a foreign judgment than the judgment would receive in the rendering state. Although
Congress, in enacting S 1738, was clearly concerned with the problem of non-recognition
of sister-state judgments rather than the possibility of "over-recognition," the chosen remedy
by its terms reaches both situations. As has been recognized by the Court, the full faith
and credit command implemented on a national level the common law doctrines governing
recognition of foreign judgments. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,437-39
(1943). Those common law doctrines provided that the effect of the foreign judgment is
determined by the law of the state where the judgment was rendered, and under the common
law no greater effect could be given in the second court than that due the judgment under
the law of the rendering court. See J. WELLS, RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECIsis 474 (1879);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 450 (1934). Hence, the full faith and credit require-
ment should be viewed as a codification of the common law rule which clearly prohibited
a second court from giving any greater effect to a judgment than it would receive in the
rendering forum. Moreover, if the rule were otherwise, difficult problems of due process
and choice of law would enter into every case, since the parties may or may not have
relied on the res judicata law of the rendering court in structuring their claims or defenses,
and the second court may or may not have a sufficient interest in the controversy to apply
its own law. See Casad, supra note 36, at 524-28. Such practical difficulties alone would
seem reason enough to adhere to the literal command of S 1738. It will be assumed throughout
this article that the full faith and credit requirement, where it applies, means that a federal
court must give the same preclusive effect to state court proceedings as would the render-
ing court.
287 U.S. 156 (1932).
The surety company sought to enjoin a state court judgment rendered against it on
a supersedeas bond on the ground the judgment was void under the due process clause
for lack of notice. In state court the company had challenged the judgment on state law
grounds and had not raised the due process issue until petitioning for rehearing in the
state supeme court. Id. at 163.
11 Id. at 164-65. The statement that the surety company could have gone directly into
federal court is based on the fundamental doctrine that the mere availability of a state
court remedy does not bar access to federal court. Presumably, if the surety company
had allowed judgment to be entered against it by default, it could have then applied for
a federal court injunction to bar enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional judgment.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65-66 (1982).
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reasonable facts ... or from a failure seasonably to pursue the
appropriate remedy.
Under American Surety, traditional principles of claim preclusion apply
in the state-to-federal context by the operation of the full faith and credit
mandate. Ordinarily, such principles will bar a federal court plaintiff from
challenging a state court judgment on grounds that could have been but
were not asserted in the state court action. 9 Indeed, Justice Brandeis'
opinion makes clear that there is no general right to withhold a federal
claim in state court in order to advance it in later federal litigation. It
would seem, then, that the problem which is the focus of this article is
partially resolved by reference to American Surety and cases like it. 0
The case law, however, is replete with apparent contradictions of the prin-
ciples of Mills and American Surety. In fact, the Supreme Court, prior
to Allen and Kremer, frequently decided similar cases without ever
mentioning full faith and credit. 1 In many decisions the Court ignored
altogether the preclusion doctrines of the rendering state and instead
drew from a general federal common law of res judicatae2 Not surprisingly,
American Surety, 287 U.S. at 169.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 18 (1982); A. VESTAL, supra note
18, at 43-59.
' See, e.g., Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); Bruckley Towers Con-
dominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 595 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1979).
&I See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (claim preclusion inapplicable as matter of
federal law to judgment creditor's claim of nondischargeability in bankruptcy proceeding),
discussed in text accompanying notes 72-79 infra; Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147
(1979) (issue preclusion applicable as matter of federal law in federal action by United States
where United States directed and financed previous state court litigation arising out of
same facts); Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929) (state court factual
determination held binding in later patent infringement action under general preclusion
principles), discussed in text accompanying notes 209-13 infra; cf. Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 n.12 (1971) (dictum) (federal
law of preclusion applies in nondiversity cases apparently without regard to nature of prior
judgment). Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), might also be viewed as a case involving
state-to-federal preclusion where the full faith and credit directive was ignored. There the
Court held that res judicata barred a federal diversity action for a deficiency judgment
after the plaintiff had lost on the same claim in state court because of a state door-closing
statute. Although the Court looked to the law of the forum state to determine the effect
of the state-court judgment, it did not clarify its reasons for doing so. Justice Rutledge
in dissent noted that the majority had not invoked full faith and credit and that the res
judicata doctrine underlying the majority's rule therefore had neither constitutional nor
statutory authority.
Regardless of its source, the res judicata ruling was problematic. The state court decision
had explicitly rested on a lack of jurisdiction to entertain the deficiency claim, and a jurisdic-
tional dismissal normally prevents the application of res judicata. The Supreme Court,
however, characterized the state judgment as a decision on the merits. As noted in one
critique, "[to hold that the [state] judgment was on the 'merits' is ... to make black that
which is white and crooked that which is straight." 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.409, at 1018 (1982). The case is probably best understood as an
application of state substantive policy under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
,2 In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), for example, neither full faith and
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cases in the lower federal courts reflect the inconsistency in Supreme
Court precedent. 3 The courts have consequently failed to develop a
coherent body of law governing the preclusive effects of state court
judgments in general' and the operation of the doctrine of claim preclusion
in particular."5
credit nor the res judicata law of the rendering state was mentioned in the opinion. Citing
to federal precedent, the Court drew upon a federal common law of res judicata. The Court,
for instance, looked to federal precedent to determine that the United States, though not
a party to the prior proceeding "had a sufficient 'laboring oar' in the conduct of the state-
court litigation to actuate principles of estoppel." Id. at 155. Similarly, the Court looked
to federal law to ascertain "whether the particular circumstances of this case justify an
exception to general principles of estoppel." Id. at 162. Two assumptions seem to underly
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court: first, that the preclusive effects of a prior state
court judgment in a later federal court action are determined according to federal common
law, and, second, that a federal court in a state-to-federal preclusion context retains
substantial discretion to modify, or reject altogether, traditional preclusion doctrine. Both
assumptions were implicitly rejected in Allen and Kremer.
'3 Compare, e.g., Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377, 1379-80 (11th Cir. 1982) (federal
law of "virtual representation" applied to determine preclusive effect of prior state court
proceeding) with Harl v. City of LaSalle, 679 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1982) (state law applied
to determine preclusive effect of prior state court dismissal for want of prosecution); Johnson
v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1980) (civil rights claim in federal court not barred by
adverse determination in state criminal trial) with Gallagher v. Frye, 631 F.2d 127, 128-29
(9th Cir. 1980) (civil rights claim in federal court barred by adverse judgment in prior state
civil action arising out of same subject matter).
11 Several lower courts followed the lead of the pre-Allen Court in deciding questions
of state-to-federal preclusion by reference to a federal common law of res judicata. See,
e.g., Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1978); Pye v. Department of Transp.,
513 F.2d 290, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Lombard v. Board of Educ. 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975). See generally Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
In Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1981), decided after Allen but before Kremer,
the court characterized as "puzzling" the question of which law to apply, federal or state,
to determine the collateral estoppel effect of an earlier state court judgment. Id. at 1326
n.11. In particular the court noted the inconsistency between Supreme Court precedent
and the command of S 1738. In a resolution typical of the cases in this area, the court
concluded that it need not decide between federal and state law because the pertinent
doctrines were essentially the same in each jurisdiction. Id. at 1326. See also Dills v. City
of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377, 1379-80 (11th Cir. 1982) (federal doctrine of "virtual representa-
tion" applied to determine preclusive effect of prior state court proceeding).
When the lower courts have applied a federal common law of res judicata to resolve
questions of state-to-federal preclusion, they have exercised a seemingly broader discretion
than they actually have under the strict mandate of § 1738. In other words, a federal court
may more readily reject a harsh application of res judicata if the federal common law,
rather than 5 1738, is deemed controlling. For example, in Lombard v. Board of Educ.,
502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975), the doctrine of claim preclusion
was held inapplicable to a federal civil rights action where the federal court plaintiff could
have raised but did not raise the civil rights claim in an earlier state court proceeding.
The Second Circuit did not address the impact of S 1738 or the rendering state's preclusion
law. Rather, the court approached the question as one involving the competing interest
of the civil rights statutes on the one hand and a flexible federal common law of res judicata
on the other. By so framing the problem, the Lombard court facilitated a relaxation of
the preclusion doctrine.
" Compare, e.g., Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
240 (1982) (federal court challenge to state custody determination barred where constitutional
claim could have been raised in prior state proceeding) with Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Servs., 648 F.2d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (dicta),
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The subject of statutory exceptions to full faith and credit was in a
similar state of ambiguity prior to Allen and Kremer. The subject received
little direct attention from the pre-Allen Court: the exceptions that were
recognized were not discussed as full faith and credit problems at all but
as questions of res judicata. The Court's rather casual fashioning of ex-
ceptions to common law res judicata doctrine contrasts sharply with the
exacting standard later formulated in Allen and Kremer for recognizing
an intended repeal of section 1738.
The well-established exception for federal habeas corpus proceedings
was first recognized in Brown v. Allen.' Without addressing any issue
of full faith and credit, the Court held that a state court rejection of a
state prisoner's constitutional claim was not conclusive on the federal
habeas corpus claim in the federal district court. Justice Frankfurter
explained that if the state court decision were to be accorded ordinary
res judicata effect, the federal court's intended role under the statute
would be defeated. "[The prior State determination of a claim under the
United States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such a claim,
else the State court would have the final say which Congress by the Act
of 1857, provided it should not have."'8 Although the validity of the Court's
statutory construction in Brown may be questioned,68 the habeas statute
was later amended to define explicitly the preclusive effect of state court
factual determinations. 9 In its present version, section 2254 unmistakably
evinces an express congressional modification of section 1738.0 Thus,
although the Brown decision offers sparse guidance in recognizing excep-
tions to full faith and credit, there can be little doubt that section 2254
is such an exception.
Exceptions to full faith and credit have also been suggested by cases
in the bankruptcy area," most notably in Brown v. Felsen,' where the
affid on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982) (state court litigant may withhold federal
constitutional claim for later assertion in federal action). See generally Castorr v. Brun-
dage, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
6, Id. at 500.
See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 330-31 (1978).
€ Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (1976)).
, Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1976) a state court determination on the merits of a factual
issue will be "presumed correct" unless the petitioner establishes the existence of one
of eight specified deficiencies in the state court proceedings. For an illustration of the
interpretive difficulties posed by the statute, see Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (Sumner
I); Sumner v. Mata, 102 S. Ct. 1303 (1982) (per curiam) (Sumner II).
I In Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US. 433 (1940), for example, the Court permitted a mortgagor
who had filed a petition in bankruptcy to collaterally attack a state court judgment confirming
a foreclosure sale. By operation of law, the filing of the bankruptcy action automatically
deprived the state court of jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceedings. Frazier-Lemke
Act, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942 (1935). The Court framed the inquiry in terms of general prin-
ciples of preclusion rather than full faith and credit. While recognizing that ordinarily the
state court judgment would be entitled to a presumption of regularity the Court stated
that Congress, through specific bankruptcy legislation, had created an exception to that
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Court addressed the effect of a prior state court judgment on a
dischargeability proceeding brought under section 17 of the former
Bankruptcy Act." In that case a state court collection suit had ended in
a stipulated settlement, the terms of which included a judgment in favor
of the guarantor against the debtor. The settlement did not indicate the
nature of the claim underlying the debtor's liability to the guarantor. The
debtor subsequently petitioned for bankruptcy, and the guarantor
contended in the bankruptcy court that the debt owed to him was the
product of fraud and therefore came within the non-dischargeability
provisions of section 17." The debtor, on the other hand, argued that there
had been no finding of fraud or deceit in the prior state court proceeding
and that res judicata therefoi'e barred relitigation of the nature of the
debt. 5
The Supreme Court held that the guarantor's right to assert the non-
dischargeability of the debt was not precluded by res judicata. Invoking
a general doctrine of preclusion instead of the full faith and credit mandate
or the res judicata law of the rendering state, Justice Blackmun reason-
ed that the statutory policy in favor of resolving section 17 questions
in bankruptcy court would be undermined by a rigid application of
preclusion doctrine. The Court, did not undertake a searching review
of the legislative history of the Act to ascertain whether Congress in-
principle. 308 U.S. at 439. The Court emphasized that the statute did not require the debtor
to challenge the jurisdiction of the state court and that any judgment of that court was
simply "void" and a "nullity." Id. at 438-39.
The case might be read as an illustration of the accepted principle that full faith and
credit does not preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the rendering court. E.g., Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 135 (1912). Nevertheless,
by the time of the Kalb decision, the Court had evinced a clear tendency toward accordingjurisdictional determinations the same finality as that accorded other determinations. See,
e.g., Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). Moreover, on the same day as Kalb, the Court
in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), held that a
prior judgment was unassailable collaterally, even on jurisdictional grounds, where the
parties had the opportunity to raise the challenge in the earlier proceeding. Kalb, then,
would seem to involve something other than the sacrosanctity of jurisdiction. Rather, the
case arguably is based on the presence of a paramount federal interest, manifested in specific
legislation, which supercedes the normal rules of res judicata and, hence, full faith and
credit. For a well developed argument that the case is explainable by reference to policies
extrinsic to the judicial branch, see Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 534 (1981).
2 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
" Section 17a of the former Bankruptcy Act provided that certain types of debts would
not be affected by a discharge, including "liabilities for obtaining money or property by
false pretenses or false representations . . . or for willful and malicious conversion," and
debts created by "fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as
an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467 SS 5-7,
84 Stat. 992.
" Felsen, 442 U.S. at 129.
75 Id.
76 The Court's specific discussion of res judicata was quite cursory. Citing only federal
precedents, the Court described the applicable principle of preclusion: "Res judicata prevents
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tended to override traditional res judicata principles, but instead relied
on "[s]ome indication that Congress intended the fullest possible inquiry
aris[ing] from the history of section 17'77
Significantly, the Brown Court viewed the "might have been litigated"
component of claim preclusion as a source of potential inequity to be
applied with caution through a weighing of competing interests. Justice
Blackmun observed: "Because res judicata may govern grounds and
defenses not previously litigated ... it blockades unexplored paths that
may lead to truth. For the sake of repose, res judicata shields the fraud
and the cheat as well as the honest person. It therefore is to be invoked
only after careful inquiry."78 In contrast, the Court pointed out that the
narrower doctrine of issue preclusion might very well apply "[i]f in the
course of adjudicating a state-law question, a state court should deter-
mine factual issues using standards identical to those of section 17, then
[issue preclusion], in the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would
bar relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court. '79
The court's analysis in Brown indicates that issue preclusion and claim
preclusion must be distinguished as separate factors in assessing the
impact of a federal statute on a state-to-federal preclusion question.
Although the Brown Court did not employ a full faith and credit analysis,
the distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion is equally
valid whether the focus is on a statutory repeal of full faith and credit
or a statutory relaxation of the rules of res judicata. In either analytical
litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to
the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding."
442 U.S. at 131.
In particular, the Court found that dischargeability issues are irrelevant to ordinary
collection proceedings and that the parties in state court would normally have little incen-
tive to litigate such issues. Id. at 134-35. Moreover, if a state court should expressly rule
on § 17 issues, giving finality to those rulings would undercut Congress' intention to com-
mit the § 17 issues to the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 135-36.
The Court also noted that the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act had eliminated
post-bankruptcy collection suits as a means of resolving certain 5 17 dischargeability issues.
A purpose of the amendments, the Court stated, was "to take these § 17 claims away from
state courts that seldom dealt with the federal bankruptcy laws and to give those claims
to the bankruptcy court so that it could develop expertise in handling them." Id.
" Id. at 138.
, Id- at 132. The "careful inquiry" in Brown addressed three separate issues: the in-
terests served by res judicata, the state court's interest in "orderly adjudication," and
the federal interests as defined by the federal statutes. Id. That interest-balancing ap-
proach and the Court's superficial review of congressional purpose suggest that there is
much broader discretion in the federal courts to relax the rules of preclusion than was
ultimately recognized in Allen and Kremer.
" Felsen, 442 U.S. at 139 n.10. After Brown the lower courts have reached inconsistent
results on the question of the applicability of collateral estoppel to dischargeability
proceedings in bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1981)
(collateral estoppel may apply as to underlying facts but not as to issue of dischargeability);
In re Fulwiler, 624 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1980) (grant of exclusive jurisdiction to bankruptcy
court renders inapplicable doctrine of collateral estoppel). For a review of the current case
law, see In re Katz, 20 Bankr. 394 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
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context, the distinction recognizes that a given statutory scheme may
affect one doctrine of preclusion while leaving another fully operative."
The Decisions
In Allen and Kremer the Supreme Court reaffirmed the primacy of the
full faith and credit statute in state-to-federal preclusion questions and,
concomitantly, narrowed the scope of federal court authority to fashion
exceptions to the statutory mandate. Since these two decisions jointly
suggest a fairly complete analytical theory of full faith and credit and
res judicata in the intersystem context, they will be examined in detail.
Allen v. McCurry
McCurry was convicted in a Missouri state court for possession of heroin
and assault with intent to kill. Before trial, McCurry moved unsuccessfully
to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his house
at the time of his arrest." While McCurry's appeal from his conviction
was pending, he filed a pro se damages action in federal court under section
1983.82 McCurry alleged a conspiracy to violate his fourth amendment
rights, an unconstitutional search of his house, and an assault following
his arrest.
In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district court
found that the only issue in McCurry's lawsuit-whether the police
lawfully entered and searched McCurry's house-was litigated on the
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate a coherent theory of statutory exceptions
to full faith and credit is reflected in the lower court decisions. In general, the courts have
recognized exceptions on the basis of "countervailing and compelling federal policies"
underlying various federal statutory schemes. Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 n.3(9th Cir. 1977) (policy behind Indian Civil Rights Act may outweigh, under certain
circumstances, the principle of full faith and credit). See also Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp.,
503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975) (policy of Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act does not permit application of collateral estoppel based on adverse state
court finding); American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1040 (1972) ("well-defined federal policies, statutory or constitutional, may compete
with those policies underlying section 1738"). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 5, S 4469.
"1 The fourth amendment claim is discussed on the merits in State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.
2d 337 (Mo. App. 1970). The trial judge admitted evidence which had been within plain
view when seized, but excluded certain articles of contraband which had been found in
dresser drawers and hidden in auto tires on a porch.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514, 515 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
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merits at his criminal trial and determined adversely to his position.'
On appeal the Eighth Circuit focused on an issue not addressed by the
district court: whether issue preclusion should bar relitigation of a fourth
amendment claim where, in light of Stone v. Powell," federal habeas corpus
was unavailable as a means of obtaining a federal forum. The circuit court
concluded that because of "the special role of federal courts in protecting
civil rights" and the conceded unavailability of habeas corpus relief, the
federal court had a duty "to consider fully, unencumbered by the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, [McCurry's] section 1983 claims."8
The Supreme Court reversed in a six-three decision.' Justice Stewart's
majority opinion began with an emphasis on the federalism policies served
by the doctrines of preclusion in a state-to-federal context. "[R]es judicata
and collateral estoppel," he said "not only reduce unnecessary litigation
and foster reliance on adjudication, but also promote the comity between
state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the
federal system."88 Moreover, sensitivity to the concerns of federalism,
Justice Stewart pointed out, was not a matter of discretion since, in the
full faith and credit statute, "Congress has specifically required all federal
" Id. The court noted that issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion applied since
the civil suit involved different parties from those in the criminal action. Accordingly, the
court barred relitigation of only the issues which were actually litigated in the first action.
The district court apparently overlooked McCurry's assault claim, which clearly had not
been determined in the criminal trial. That oversight provided one ground for the Eighth
Circuit's subsequent reversal. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
449 U.S. 90 (1980). For the subsequent history of McCurry's continuing efforts to recover
for the alleged assault, see McCurry v. Allen, 688 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1982).
"1 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). In Stone the Court held that a state prisoner could no longer
assert a fourth amendment claim in a petition for federal habeas corpus relief if the prisoner
had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in state court.
Allen, 606 F.2d at 799.
87 449 U.S. 90 (1980). When the case came before the Supreme Court, only one other
circuit had clearly endorsed the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit. See Johnson v. Mateer,
625 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1980). On the other hand, many commentators had taken the position
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 superceded to varying degrees the common law res judicata doctrines
and the federal courts' full faith and credit obligation. See Averitt, Federal Section 1983
Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 191, 195-96 (1972); McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims
(pt. 2), 60 VA. L. REv. 250, 276-77 (1974); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases:
An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 859, 864 (1976); Torke, supra note 52,
at 568-73; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133,
1338-42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Note, The Preclusive Effect of State
Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 610, 642-52 (1978).
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980). Justice Stewart's opinion recognized "one
general limitation" on the operation of collateral estoppel-that the doctrine "cannot apply
when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair
opportunity' to litigate [the] issue in the earlier case." Id. at 95. In a footnote the court
cautioned that other considerations may require an exception to the normal rules of
preclusion in particular cases and denied the dissenters' suggestion that a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" was intended to be the single determinative factor. Id. at n.7. The




courts to give preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever the
courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so .... I
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Court was required to reach two
separate conclusions: first, that the normal rules of preclusion, including
the mandate of section 1738, are fully applicable to federal actions under
the civil rights statute, and, second, that the decision in Stone v. Powell0
did not require a relaxation of the ordinary doctrines of full faith and
credit and collateral estoppel. An examination of the language of section
1983 revealed nothing to the majority which "remotely expresses any con-
gressional intent to contravene the common law rules of preclusion or
to repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of 28
U.S.C. 5 1738."'1 In reviewing the legislative history of section 1983, the
Court recognized that the strong motive behind the enactment of the
statute was congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient
in protecting federal rights. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, in
the context of the legislative history as a whole, such congressional concern
"len[t] only the most equivocal support" to the argument that Congress
had intended to override section 1738 or the common law preclusion
doctrines.2 Although Congress had concededly altered the balance of
power between the state and federal courts in enacting section 1983, the
result was an addition to the jurisdiction of the federal courts and not
a subtraction from that of the state courts. Justice Stewart observed that
"since repeals by implication are disfavored, much clearer support than
this would be required to hold that 5 1738 and the traditional rules of
preclusion are not applicable to 5 1983 suits.""3
The Court further explained that Stone, the narrow basis of the Eighth
" Id. at 96. The language of the quoted passage, by failing to reveal the exact role of
state law in determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, is artfully vague.
It is unclear, under the quoted statement, whether state law governs all aspects of preclusion.
The uncertainty was removed, in part, by Kremer.
o 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
91 Allen, 449 U.S. at 97-98.
Id. at 99.
's Id. (citations omitted). Justice Stewart drew on descriptive references to 5 1983 in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), to show that the Court's prior interpretations of the
statute did not necessarily imply that Congress had intended to allow relitigation of federal
issues "simply because the state court's decision may have been erroneous." 449 U.S. at
101. In Monroe Justice Douglas writing for the Court had explained that the 42d Congress
found the new federal remedy to be necessary because of three perceived problems in
the state courts: where state substantive law was facially unconstitutional, where state
procedural law was inadequate to allow full litigation of a constitutional claim, and where
state procedural law, though adequate in theory, was inadequate in practice. 365 U.S. at
173-74. Justice Stewart's opinion interpreted the Monroe language to mean that an excep-
tion to normal preclusion principles might be justified in the face of inadequate state
procedures or "where a state court failed to even acknowledge the existence of the con-
stitutional principle on which a litigant based his claim." 449 U.S. at 101. In a passage
which presaged the Kremer holding, the Court explained that such an exception would
be "essentially the same" as the general limitation on the preclusion doctrine-the
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Circuit's holding in Allen, had concerned the "prudent exercise of federal
court jurisdiction" under the habeas corpus statutes and that the decision
did not bear on section 1983 or the preclusion doctrines. 4 In addition,
the Court rejected the broader principle underlying the court of appeals'
holding-"that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one
unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court,
regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises."95 The
Court found no authority for such a proposition in the Constitution or
in section 1983. The Court observed, moreover, that a general distrust
of the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on
constitutional issues is wholly inconsistent with the established principle,
reaffirmed in Stone itself, that the state courts are constitutionally obliged
and presumptively able to uphold federal law.96
In dissent, Justice Blackmun disputed the Court's conclusion that Con-
gress intended the federal courts to give full preclusive effect to prior
state adjudications in section 1983 cases. Justice Blackmun found such
a supposition "senseless" in light of Congress' obvious aim to correct the
wrongs perpetuated by the state authorities, including state courts.97 In
addition, the dissenters, disagreeing with the majority's intepretation of
requirement that the party against whom a bar is asserted have had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court. Id.
The Allen Court's interpretation of Monroe may be faulted for taking Justice Douglas'
language out of context. In Monroe Justice Douglas enumerated the three circumstances
of state court inadequacy as reasons for the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, not as
criteria governing the availability of a federal forum. Justice Stewart, however, in an attempt
to reconcile the Allen holding with precedent, used the Monroe language as an indication
of when a civil rights action might be brought.
Allen, 449 U.S. at 103.
9 Id.
The majority excluded from its holding the question whether a 5 1983 claimant can
litigate in federal court an issue which might have been but was not raised in a prior
state court proceeding. Id. at 94 n.5, 97 n.10. Indeed, the petitioners in Allen expressly
assumed that the "might have been litigated" aspect of claim preclusion would be inap-
plicable to a federal civil rights claim. Petition for certiorari cited supra note 12.
1 Id. at 110. Interestingly, the full faith and credit statute is not mentioned in Justice
Blackmun's dissent. Writing for himself and Justices Brennen and Marshall, Justice Blackmun
described the issue before the Court as "whether a common-law doctrine is to apply to
S 1983," 449 U.S. at 106, and whether the 42d Congress intended "the then existing common-
law doctrine of preclusion [to] survive enactment of § 1983," id. at 107. The dissenters'
failure to focus on the mandate of § 1738 weakens their position. The intended effect of
a statute on pre-existing common law is a different inquiry from the intended effect of
a subsequent statute on an earlier one. Successive statutes will be construed to be consis-
tent with one another whenever possible, and the presumption is against an implied repeal
of the earlier law. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976). In contrast, when
Congress addresses a matter previously governed by federal common law, the presump-
tion is that Congress intended to displace the common law. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981). By referring to the maxim that repeals by implication are disfavored,
the Allen majority buttressed its conclusion that § 1983 was not intended to work a partial
repeal of § 1738. The dissent in treating the question as one of the effect of a statute
on the common law, rather than the effect of a statute on a statute, thereby implicitly
lowered ,the threshold showing required to establish the requisite congressional intent.
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precedent, argued that cases such as Monroe v. Pape9 and Mitchum v.
Foste 9 established the federal courts as the primary and final arbiters
of constitutional rights.' 0
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co.
Kremer, a Jew, filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."0 He contended that his termination from employment with
Chemical Construction Company ("Chemico") and the failure to rehire him
were the result of religious and national-origin discrimination."2 Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(c), the EEOC referred the complaint to the
New York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD)."' After an investiga-
tion, the NYHRD found no probable cause to believe that Chemico had
engaged in the discriminatory practice charged, and on appeal to the
NYHRD's Appeal Board, affirmed the agency's determination.0 5 Kremer
then filed, pro se, a petition with the Appellate Division of the New York
" 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
il The dissenters suggested that the Court's decision was inconsistent with the reserva-
tion doctrine of England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Under England a federal plaintiff who is required by the abstention doctrine to submit
his constitutional claim first to a state court may return to the federal court for a new
determination of the constitutional claim so long as the litigant makes an explicit reserva-
tion to that effect in state court. The Allen dissenters relied on broad language from England,
which endorsed the right of a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a federal
court to have his constitutional claims decided by that court.
The majority rightly rejected the suggestion that England was applicable. See Chang,
Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31
HAST. L.J. 1337, 1368-70 (1980); Currie, supra note 68, at 331-32. England was an effort
by the Supreme Court to ameliorate the harsh results of the abstention doctrine and to
ensure that abstention operated as a postponement rather than an abdication of the exercise
of federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the England Court recognized that "if a party freely
and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates
them there, and has them decided there, then . . . he has elected to forego his right to
return to the District Court." 375 U.S. at 419. The Allen facts, of course, did not involve
an initial resort to federal court followed by a judicial order of abstention. Rather, the
federal court in Allen did not get the case until after the state criminal trial had ended
and the state court had determined McCurry's federal constitutional claim. Since McCurry
had not properly invoked federal court jurisdiction in the first instance, England's reserva-
tion doctrine was simply inapposite. England would seem similarly unavailable as a means
of overcoming the operation of claim preclusion in a state-to-federal context. The England
procedural device is confined to a reservation of constitutional claims when a federal court
abstains; it is not a means generally available for starving off the effect of res judicata.
See, e.g., Burgess v. Mitchell Motors, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 588, 589 (N.D. Ga. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 615 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980).
"' 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. III 1979).
,02 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 468, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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State Supreme Court to set aside the adverse administrative determina-
tion. That court unanimously affirmed the decision of the Appeal Board
and no further appeal was taken."6
After the conclusion of the state court proceedings, the EEOC
determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that Kremer's
claims were valid and issued a notice of right to sue."7 Kremer then
instituted a civil action in district court. On Chemico's motion, the district
court dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds because of the prior
state court determination. 08 The Second Circuit affirmed. 0 9
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the Second
Circuit."0 Writing for the majority, Justice White framed the issue before
the Court as "whether Congress intended Title VII to supercede [sic] the
principles of comity and repose embodied in § 1738."' Justice White thus
made clear from the outset that the presumptive applicability of section
1738 would be the focus of the inquiry.
Under New York law, the judgment of the appeals court affirming the
adverse administrative determination precluded Kremer from bringing
any other action based upon the same grievance in the New York courts."'
1 Kremer v. State Div. on Human Rights, 402 N.Y.S.2d 699 (App. Div. 1978).
"0 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 468, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
1' In the district court Chemico argued that the decision of the Appellate Division
constituted a bar under the reasoning of Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d
265 (2d Cir. 1977), where the court had held a similar state court determination to be res
judicata in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The district court, noting that Mitchell
had expressly left open the question of the effect of a prior state court determination on
the later Title VII action, initially denied the motion. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
464 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Four months after the Second Circuit had applied the
reasoning of Mitchell to a claim under Title VII in Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d
60 (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979), Chemico renewed its motion, and the district
court dismissed the complaint. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
10 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980).
10 Kremer v. Chemical Constr Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982). At the time of the Supreme
Court's decision, a majority of the courts which had considered the issue had refused to
give preclusive effect to state court proceedings in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Unger v. Con-
solidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1981, Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626
F.2d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612
F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
464 F.2d 9, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1972). Commentators, on the other hand, had concluded that
a de novo hearing in state court should have ordinary res judicata effect but that a state
court affirmance of an administrative finding should not bar a de novo federal action. See
Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1485, 1517-20 (1981).
" Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1888.
,,2 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 3000 (McKinney 1972). That New York had taken the uncommon
route of statutorily prescribing the effect of a prior adjudication and thereby codifying
a rule of claim preclusion, did not alter the operation of S 1738. The Supreme Court had
difficulty in deciding whether Kremer involved claim preclusion or issue preclusion and
ultimately suggested that both doctrines might apply. Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1897 n.22.
The Court noted that some courts had invoked res judicata to bar claims arising from
the same transaction even if brought under different statutes. Id. The Court's suggestion
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Section 1738, if applicable, would bind the federal court to the same
doctrine of preclusion and would bar Kremer from relitigating the same
question in federal court. Kremer advanced two principal arguments for
avoiding the operation of section 1738: first, that Congress, in enacting
Title VII, intended to relieve federal courts of the statutory obligation
to give full faith and credit to state court decisions; second, that even
if section 1738 applied the New York administrative and judicial
proceedings were not entitled to preclusive effect in federal court because
the issues in the state and federal proceedings were different, and because
the hearing and review in the state forum were procedurally inadequate.
In responding to the first argument, Justice White emphasized that
an exception to section 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute
contains an express or implied partial repeal.""' 3 Invoking traditional
principles of statutory construction,"' the Court found that neither the
language nor operation of Title VII revealed a clear incompatibility
between Title VII and section 1738."' Justice White wrote that while Ti-
tle VII and been construed to guarantee a trial de novo following state
and federal administrative proceedings, "neither the statute nor our
decisions indicate that the final judgment of a state court is subject to
redetermination at such a trial.""' 6
Likewise, section 706(b) of Title VII,"7 which requires the EEOC to give
"substantial weight" to findings made in state proceedings, was construed
is problematic. The rule of claim preclusion requires that the prior court have had jurisdic-
tion to entertain the claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 25 comment e (1982).
Thus, in order for the doctrine of claim preclusion to be technically applicable, the New
York court would have to have had jurisdiction to hear Kremer's Title VII claim. The
Supreme Court, however, has not decided whether Title VII claims are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts, see Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1896 n.20, and there is a conflict
on the issue among the lower courts. See Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612
F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (recognizing conflict but finding
it unnecessary to decide jurisdictional issue); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp.
43 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding jurisdiction to be exclusive); Bennun v. Board of Governors,
413 F. Supp. 1274 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding jurisdiction to be concurrent).
The Court additionally suggested that the "might have been litigated" aspect of claim
preclusion would be available to prevent Kremer from arguing in federal court that his
national origin discrimination claim differed significantly from his religious discrimination
claim. 102 S. Ct. at 1889 n.4. Although Kremer did not make such an argument and the
Court's suggestion was thus purely dicta, the suggestion has been seized upon by at Jeast
one lower court to support the holding that claim preclusion applies generally to civil rights
actions. Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 198-99 (7th Cir. 1982).
11 Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1890.
... As in Allen, the Court emphasized that successive statutes should be construed
consistently whenever possible and that repeals by implication are not favored. The Court
went on to identify the two well-settled categories of repeals by implication-where
provisions in the two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, and where a later statute "covers
the whole subject" of the earlier one and is unambiguously intended as a substitute. Kremer,
102 S. Ct. at 1890.
1 Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1890-91.
1" Id. at 1891 (emphasis in original).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
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to indicate only the minimum level of deference the EEOC must give to
all state determinations. The "substantial weight" provision, Justice White
stated, "does not bar affording the greater preclusive effect which may
be required by section 1738 if judicial action is involved."'' 8 Finally, the
majority found nothing in the legislative history of Title VII to suggest
that Congress intended to provide an absolute right to relitigate in federal
court an issue resolved by a state court; Congress had not intended to
supplant state employment discrimination laws or to disturb the traditional
operation of res judicata."9 As in Allen, the mere fact that Congress was
aware of the existing inadequacies in some state's fair employment
procedures did not mean that Congress intended for all state judicial
determinations to be disregarded.12
Kremer's second line of argument constituted the true focus of disagree-
ment among members of the Court. The four dissenters apparently would
concede that a full trial in state court on the merits of an employment
discrimination claim should bar subsequent federal court proceedings. 2'
The real dispute among the Justices was whether the more limited state
court proceeding involved in Kremer should result in preclusion. The ma-
11 Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1891. In a somewhat inconsistent vein, the majority noted that
federal review of discrimination charges would be pointless if the federal agency or court
were bound by state agency decisions. Id at n.7. Hence, the court implicitly recognized
that the "substantial weight" standard did constitute a maximum level of deference for
at least some purposes.
Justice Blackmun, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent,
criticized the majority's "schizophrenic reading" of S 706(b). Id. at 1901. The majority, in
Justice Blackmun's view, read the provision to mean that state administrative proceedings
do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court but that a limited state court review affirming
those same administrative findings does have such a preclusive effect. The dissenters argued
that such a position was unsupportable since, in accordance with New York law, the state
court decided only whether the state agency decision was arbitrary or capricious and did
not decide the merits of Kremer's discrimination claim. Thus, in effect, the Court was giving
preclusive effect to state agency proceedings contrary to the congressional intent of Title
VII. Id. Justice Stevens, also dissenting, agreed that the New York court's review of the
administrative proceedings was not on the merits of Kremer's discrimination claim and
that "Congress intended the claimant to have at least one opportunity to prove his case
in a de novo trial in court." Id. at 1912.
Il' Id. at 1893-94. The Court did not cite to any legislative discussion of §1738 or, indeed,
to any indication in the debates that members of Congress were aware of the existence
and operation of the statute. The task of divining legislative intent is particularly fanciful
when the question is the intended effect of one statute on an earlier one and where Congress
may not even have been cognizant of the earlier statute. In the face of the ambiguous
legislative history, most lower courts concluded prior to Kremer that in enacting Title VII
Congress intended to override the ordinary operation of res judicata and full faith and
credit. See cases cited supra note 110.
122 The Court seemed particularly impressed with isolated statements from the
congressional debates suggesting that Congress believed ordinary principles of res judicata
would operate in Title VII cases. See Krerner, 102 S. Ct. at 1893-94. The problem is that
such statements, as pointed out by the dissent, uniformly addressed the issue of successive
federal court proceedings rather than state and federal proceedings. See id. at 1906-07
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 1904 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1911 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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jority quickly disposed of the contention that the issues in each action
were sufficiently different to avoid a bar of the Title VII lawsuit. Justice
White found the elements of a successful employment discrimination claim
under New York law and federal law to be "virtually identical."' He con-
cluded that when the New York court affirmed the NYHRD's dismissal,
it "necessarily decided that petitioner's claim under New York law was
meritless, and thus it also decided that a Title VII claim arising from
the same events would be equally meritless."' Justice White expressly
rejected the dissenters' suggestion that the New York court's determina-
tion was not a ruling on the merits of Kremer's claim."u
The majority then turned to "the more serious contention"'5 that the
state administrative and judicial proceedings were so fundamentally
flawed as to place them outside the operation of section 1738. Kremer
argued that the NYHRD's investigation of his complaint had been minimal,
that the New York court proceeding had been a narrow review of
administrative action, and that he had not yet enjoyed a full hearing on
the merits of his claim of discrimination. Justice White's response clarified
a point that had been in contention among the Justices in Allen. ' Noting
that the proper test was whether Kremer had been offered a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue in the prior proceeding,
Justice White went on to explain the meaning of that test:
Our previous decisions have not specified the source or defined the
content of the requirement that the first adjudication offer a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. But for present purposes, where we are
bound by the statutory directive of section 1738, state proceedings
need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify
for the full-faith-and-credit guaranteed by federal law.'"
Applying that standard to the state proceedings available to Kremer,
the Court easily concluded that New York's system of administrative in-
vestigation, appeal, and judicial review was sufficient under the due
"2 Id. at 1896.
123 Id.
" Id at 1896 n.21. Although the majority's view of the scope of the New York court
proceeding may be disputed, see id at 1903 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1911 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Justice White's opinion should be interpreted on its own terms and not more
broadly than its author intended. To the majority, the case involved preclusion of a claim
or issue actually determined on the merits in a prior state court proceeding.
123 Id. at 1897.
'' Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
1 Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1897. As the Court explained, the minimal due process test
is consistent with the directive of S 1738: a state court proceeding which fails to satisfy
due process standards gives rise to a constitutionally infirm judgment which is not entitled
to recognition in any court, whether in the rendering state or elsewhere. Thus, "other
state and federal courts would still be providing a state court judgment with the 'same'
preclusive effect as the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged." Id. at 1898.
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process clause." Thus, having already established that Title VII did not
override section 1738 and that New York law would bar Kremer from
bringing any further court action in a New York state court on his
discrimination claim, the court held that Kremer was likewise barred from
pursuing his Title VII claim in federal court.
Kremer, like Allen, illustrates that adherence to preclusion doctrines
in the state-to-federal context serves the principle of comity as well as
the traditional res judicata goals of judicial economy, finality, and repose.
The Court made clear that in giving effect to a prior state court judg-
ment, a federal court's duty to accept the rules of preclusion chosen by
the rendering state is not merely a matter of wise policy but is instead
a congressional mandate. Kremer likewise mirrored Allen in its pronounce-
ment of a stringent standard for establishing express or implied excep-
tions to section 1738. In the face of strong arguments to the contrary,
the Court in each case concluded that Congress had left intact the state
courts' power to render a binding determination.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of Kremer was its explana-
tion of the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard under section
1738. The standard was first developed as a safeguard for the application
of collateral estoppel, primarily in cases involving nonmutuality of
estoppel." In such cases, the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard
required the court to consider a variety of factors, including whether the
party to be estopped had an incentive to fully litigate the issue in the
first suit and whether there were significant differences in available
procedures between the first and second action."' Although Allen alluded
several times to the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard, it
did not define it.'31 In Kremer, however, the Court revealed that the stand-
"2 The dissenting Justices argued that the minimal due process standard announced by
the Court was contrary to the legislative intent of Title VH. "In Title VII, Congress wanted
to assure discrimination victims more than bare due process; it wanted them to have the
benefit of a vigorous effort to eliminate discrimination." Id. at 1906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissenters' position essentially was that a federal court should not bar a Title VII
action on the grounds of res judicata unless the prior state court proceedings were the
substantive and procedural equivalent of what the complainant would have received in
a federal forum. The same position is advanced in Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra
note 110, at 1517-20.
11 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). See generally Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections
on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615 (1980).
12 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979).
131 One commentator argued, after Allen but before Kremer, that the full and fair
opportunity to litigate ensures a free choice of forum, and that a federal court need not
adhere to a state's preclusion rules if the rules require a would-be federal litigant to raise
all defenses, including federal defenses, in the state court. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term,
95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 287-88 (1981). The suggestion seems to be that a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" means an opportunity to litigate in federal court, at least for a
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ard was much more narrow in the context of state-to-federal preclusion
than in an intrasystem context. Where section 1738 applies, a federal court
need only inquire whether the state court proceeding satisfied the
minimum procedural requirements of due process."'
Although Kremer should be viewed as a case involving issue preclusion,
Justice White's discussion of the due process standard indicates that the
same standard governs questions of both issue preclusion and claim
preclusion under section 1738.1' The standard presumably would require
a court to assess the fairness of the procedures available to a litigant
in state court even though the litigant chose not to take advantage of
them.' If such available procedures met minimum due process
requirements, then the state's rules of claim preclusion would be binding
under section 1738. Such a conclusion, however, does not mean that the
federal court would be barred from considering other factors which might
persuade a litigant to withhold a federal claim in state court. Although
it is less than clear on the point, Kremer should not be read to prohibit
the federal courts from invoking the rendering state's own exceptions
to the application of res judicata."' In short, once it is determined that
the state court action provided basic procedural fairness to the litigant,
then the federal court is compelled by section 1738 to give effect to the
state judgment according to the state's law of res judicata. The law of
res judicata, of course, includes not only the rules of preclusion but also
the exceptions to those rules.'36
S 1983 claim. The Supreme Court, however, rejected a similar suggestion in Allen itself.
Allen, 449 U.S. at 103.
13 Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1897-98.
See id. at 1897 ("state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum pro-
cedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify
for the full-faith-and-credit guaranteed by federal law").
The articulation of the standard as an "opportunity to litigate" should not be viewed
as an expansion of the traditional doctrine of collateral estoppel. It has been argued that
under an "opportunity to litigate" standard issue preclusion should turn not on whether
the party actually litigated the issue but on whether the party had the incentive and
opportunity to do so. Vestal, The Restatment (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 468-69 (1981). Professor Vestal's position is that where there is
an incentive to litigate an issue, the failure to do so constitutes an admission. Professor
Vestal would thus reject the traditional requirement of collateral estoppel that the issue
to be precluded must have been actually litigated. Professor Hazard, who was Reporter
for the Second Restatement, succinctly points out the difficulty with that approach:
"Professor Vestal's 'opportunity' theory allows the court to infer that the issue was important
to a party whose behavior indicates he thought the issue was unimportant, and, having
done that, to convict the party by his silence." Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement
of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 564, 584 (1981).
'" See Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1899 ("The fact that Mr. Kremer failed to avail himself of
the full procedures provided by state law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy.").
135 The Allen Court expressly noted that the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" stand-
ard was not the sole determinant in deciding whether to apply ordinary rules of collateral
estoppel. Allen, 449 U.S. at 95 n.7.
38 One implication of Kremer is that preclusion in an intersystem context, where the
full faith and credit statute applies, is a less flexible doctrine than preclusion in an
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APPLICATION AND SCOPE OF ALLEN AND KREMER
The full faith and credit statute, as interpreted in Allen and Kremer,
would seem to provide a ready answer to all questions of state-to-federal
preclusion, including the question of the previously unlitigated federal
claim: as in other situations, the claim should be allowed or disallowed
according to the applicable state rules of preclusion. Nevertheless, there
is a substantial body of case law holding that the federal courts under
certain circumstances should bar, as a matter of federal law, only those
claims which were actually litigated in a prior state court proceeding.3 '
The decisions are not in agreement as to the rationale for such a rule
or the circumstances when such a rule should be followed; in addition
several theories of varying validity emerge from the case law. The theories
principally contend either that the particular rule of preclusion is not
within the scope of section 1738"M or that the particular claim is a statutory
exception to section 1738."39
Scope of Section 1738
One reason for distinguishing the "might have been litigated" aspect
intrasystem context. For example, a federal court faced with a question regarding the
preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment will look to the federal common law
of res judicata. Id. at 96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4466, at 620-21. In such a circumstance, the federal
court can evaluate potential exceptions to the doctrines of preclusion and exercise an in-
dependent discretion in deciding whether to bar litigation of certain claims or issues. On
the other hand, a federal court confronted with a question regarding the preclusive effect
of a prior state court judgment must adhere to the state's doctrine of preclusion unless
Congress has indicated otherwise or the state proceedings were so unfair as to violate
due process. Absent such an exception, the federal court will most often be acting predic-
tively: the court must ascertain the state's rules of preclusion and then apply those rules
as a state court would apply them to the facts at hand. This "predictive" mode is familiar
to the federal courts, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956), and may result in a wooden application of
state law. Cf. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 238-40 (1948) (federal courts' adherence to state law in diversity
context debases federal judicial process by reducing federal courts to mere mimics of state
courts).
,3 See cases cited supra note 10.
133 See, e.g., Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), affid, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983)
(§ 1738 does not bar civil rights action after state court conviction on guilty plea), discuss-
ed at notes 164-67 and accompanying text infra; Chapman v. Aetna Finance Co., 615 F.2d
361, 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (compulsory counterclaim rule not within scope of S 1738), discussed
at note 147 infra.
1"9 See, e.g., Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 145-46
(3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (plurality) (dicta), aff'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982) (federal
civil rights action not barred by ordinary claim preclusion where federal plaintiff did not
raise federal claim in prior state proceeding); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S.
623, 664 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over antitrust claim
creates exception to doctrines of preclusion).
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of claim preclusion from other preclusion doctrine goes to the underlying
purpose of the full faith and credit obligation. As discussed earlier,
1 40
section 1738 renders res judicata doctrines operative on a national level.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the intended function of
the full faith and credit clause was to avoid "relitigation in other states
of adjudicated issues, while leaving to the law of the forum state the ap-
plication of the predetermined facts to the new problem."' Similarly, the
policies of preclusion are at their strongest when a party seeks to relitigate
claims or issues that have been actually determined in an earlier
proceeding."4 It can therefore be argued that the policies of preclusion
and the full faith and credit directive are satisfied by giving full recogni-
tion to actual judicial determinations; but where an issue which could have
been raised defensively in a prior action was neither asserted nor deter-
mined, there is no pertinent judgment record to which to give conclusive
effect.
The argument has an appealing logic but must be applied with due
regard for the policies underlying section 1738. Where the federal claim
belatedly asserted in federal court would nullify or impair rights
established by the prior state court judgment, then full faith and credit
principles are fully applicable.' In such a case, the conclusiveness of the
140 See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
14 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 407 (1952).
142 In United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950), the Court described the
following passage as the "classic statement of the rule of res judicata":
[A] right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed
in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if
the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact
once so determined must, as between the same parties, be taken as conclusively
established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.
(quoting Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)). Accord Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1899 (1982) ("In our system of jurisprudence the
usual rule is that merits of a legal claim once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction
are not subject to redetermination in another forum. Such a fundamental departure from
traditional rules of preclusion, enacted into federal law, can be justified only if plainly stated
by Congress."); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1915) ("It is a fundamental principle
of jurisprudence, arising from the very nature of courts of justice and the objects for which
they are established, that a question of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards be disputed between
the same parties."); cf. supra note 22 and accormpanying text (policy of protecting integrity
of prior judgment stronger than policy of judicial economy).
14 If the federal court were to entertain such an action, the court arguably would violate
the principle that the lower courts do not sit in review of state court judgments. Cf. Huffman
v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975) ("Federal post-trial intervention in a fashion designed
to annul the results of a state trial . . . deprives the States of a function which quite
legitimately is left to them, that of overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional
issues which arise in civil litigation over which they have jurisdiction."). The Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to review state court judgments under 28 U.S.C. S 1257 (1976) is, by implica-
tion, exclusive. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Currie, supra
note 68, at 321-25. Professor Currie makes the interesting suggestion that S 1257's exclusivity
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prior judgment is at stake, and the section 1738 policies of consistency,
finality, and federal-to-state comity are implicated. A typical illustration
involves a litigant who, after unsuccessfully defending a state civil en-
forcement proceeding on state law grounds, brings a federal action
challenging the underlying state statute or its application on federal
constitutional grounds. In Castorr v. Brundage,' for example, plaintiffs
brought a federal action challenging the state's termination of their
parental rights. In the termination proceeding in state court, the parents
had defended purely on state law grounds. They subsequently sought in
federal court a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the termination
statutes and an award of custody of their child. The Sixth Circuit, aptly
characterizing the federal lawsuit as a "collateral attack" upon the state
court judgment,' held that res judicata was a bar" regardless of the
constitutes a federal interest sufficient to justify a departure from § 1738, thereby freeing
the federal courts to give a greater preclusive effect to state court judgments than would
the courts in the rendering state. Id. Thus, the federal courts may invoke a "uniform federal
law of preclusion in cases that varying state laws may not foreclose." Id. at 324. It is doubtful,
however, that the implied exclusivity of § 1257 satisfies the stringent standard enunciated
in Allen and Kremer for showing a partial repeal of the full faith and credit statute.
According to one commentator, the Rooker doctrine and the principles of claim preclusion
are identical in scope, and the Rooker doctrine rather than res judicata or full faith and
credit requires dismissal of a federal action which is based on the same claim as a prior
state court proceeding. See Chang, supra note 100. Professor Chang contends that because
the Rooker doctrine applies, the defect in the federal proceedings is jurisdictional and
therefore non-waivable. Professor Chang's argument notwithstanding, the preferable ap-
proach to state-to-federal preclusion would seem to be that of full faith and credit. Under
Rooker, the inquiry ought to be whether the federal action is in substance an appeal from
a prior state court judgment. The ordinary concept of an appeal, however, does not fit
the facts of many state-to-federal preclusion questions. For example, where a state court
litigant seeks some form of federal relief that does not include a nullification of the state
court judgment, Rooker is inapplicable. Nevertheless, the full faith and credit mandate may
be implicated if the federal action is deemed to involve the same claim as the state court
proceeding. Professor Chang seeks to avoid this problem by uniquely defining "appeal"
as "any claim that could not be brought as an original action because it is barred by a
previous judgment." Chang, supra note 100, at 1354. Such a definition ignores the Rooker
Court's evident understanding of an "appeal" as an action to reverse or modify an earlierjudgment. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416. Another problem with the proposal for an expansive
use of Rooker is the absolutist nature of jurisdictional defects. Judge-made exceptions tojurisdictional doctrines are theoretically unavailable while, on the other hand, the courts
have carved out various exceptions to res judicata. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 26, 28 (1982). In the sensitive and changing area of state-to-federal preclusion,
the trend should be away from the rigid formalism of Rooker.
. 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982).
Id. at 533.
"' A contrary approach was suggested in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs.
Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (plurality opinion), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982),
where the court held habeas corpus to be an inappropriate vehicle for challenging a state's
stautory scheme for termination of parental rights. Judge Burke, writing for the plurality,
reasoned that the plaintiff could raise her constitutional claim in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 if she had not previously asserted the claim in state court: "[The plaintiff]
can raise federal constitutional issues in the state court, in which case she will be barred
by res judicata from raising them in federal court, or she can reserve them in the state
proceeding, and assert them in federal court under S 1983." 648 F.2d at 145-46. The plurality's
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plaintiffs failure to litigate the federal challenge in state court. The holding
in Castorr was correct because it prevented the plaintiffs from using a
federal action to abrogate an adverse decision in state court. Allowing
the plaintiffs to raise their federal claim in a subsequent action would
have directly undermined the policies of section 1738; invocation of full
faith and credit was therefore appropriate.
Similarly, a state's procedural rules, such as a compulsory counterclaim
rule, may operate to bar the litigant from asserting the belated federal
claim in state or federal court. Such a procedural rule should be viewed
as within the mandate of section 1738 since it is part of the state's law
of res judicata. 147 In Southern Jam, Inc. v. Robinson,'48 county officials had
obtained an injunction in state court barring a scheduled rock concert.
In the injunction proceeding, the concert promoters had defended on equal
protection grounds but had not asserted a first amendment defense. Three
years later, the promoters sued for damages in federal court alleging that
their first amendment freedoms had been violated by the state court
injunction.' The court of appeals held that the federal action was barred
under section 1738 on the basis of the state's compulsory counterclaim
rule." 0
The result in Southern Jam was clearly correct but could have been
suggestion is based on the erroneous view that 5 1983 constitutes an exception to the claim
preclusion component of full faith and credit. After Allen there is no principled basis for
recognizing such an exception. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanyirg text.
... In Chapman v. Aetna Finance Co., 615 F.2d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1980), the court espoused
the contrary view, finding that a state's compulsory counterclaim rule for purposes of full
faith and credit "is more properly analyzed as a legislative act than as an element of that
state's judicial proceedings." The court reasoned that the procedural rule served an
essentially local interest in judicial economy that was separate from the national interest
in avoiding relitigation of adjudicated issues and was not binding on the federal court under
5 1738. The court's analysis is vulnerable on several points. First, even a state's statutory
law may be binding under full faith and credit if the law defines the effect of a judgment.
In Kremer, for example, New York legislation prescribed the preclusive effect of the state
judicial proceedings and was binding under S 1738 on the federal court. See supra note
112. Moreover, compulsory counterclaim rules serve an interest beyond that of judicial
economy: they encourage reliance on adjudication and foster repose by the adverse party.
Once a given litigation has ended, each party can assume that all related claims have been
extinguished. Reliance and repose, surely important goals in an intersystem context, are
implemented by the full faith and credit mandate. Finally, the Chapman court's approach
would require a federal court to engage in a cumbersome process of ad hoc evaluation
of every procedural or statutory rule of preclusion to determine whether it was included
within the scope of S 1738. Such a process would undermine the very values underlying
the full faith and credit requirement-certainty and predictability in the intersystem effects
of judgments. It should be noted that the Chapman court did conclude that a state's
compulsory counterclaim rule should generally be accorded recognition as a matter of com-
ity. 615 F.2d at 364. Moreover, in a later decision a different panel of the Fifth Circuit
treated a state compulsory counterclaim rule as within the scope of S 1738 without citation
to Chapman. See Southern Jam, Inc. v. Robinson, 675 F.2d 94 (1982).
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reached without reliance on the rendering state's procedural rule. If the
object of the federal claim is to defeat the initial judgment, the core full-
faith-and-credit value of ensuring conclusiveness of judgments is directly
implicated so that the mandate of section 1738 is fully applicable. In
Southern Jam the first amendment contention could have been raised as
a defense in the state court proceeding; the failure to raise it there should
preclude a later collateral attack even if the attack is disguised in the
form of damages. The rendering state's law of res judicata, in addition
to the compulsory counterclaim rule, would ordinarily compel such a
result."'
Under certain circumstances involving successive state and federal
actions, on the other hand, the full faith and credit mandate will not apply.
Where the belated federal claim would not destroy or undermine the prior
judgment but would impose an independent liability on the adverse par-
ty, then neither full faith and credit principles nor the doctrines of
preclusion are called forth. For example, state criminal defendants after
Allen are faced with a choice of raising their fourth amendment defenses
in state court and thereby risking a final adverse determination in that
forum, or withholding such defenses for later assertion in federal court
and thereby incurring a heightened risk of conviction."5 2 For reasons of
strategy, the second alternative in this "Hobson's choice"'- may be the
more appealing one in some situations. For instance, the defendant may
accept a reduced punishment in exchange for a plea of guilty but still
wish to bring a civil suit for an antecedent constitutional violation." In
such a case, the federal action would not be an attempt to nullify the
state criminal conviction but instead would represent an effort by the
defendant to secure a determination on issues collateral to, and unresolved
by, the earlier judgment."5 Hence, the federal action would not seem to
implicate the policies of res judicata or full faith and credit.
"I In other contexts the Supreme Court has recognized that damages actions which
challenge state official conduct may be as intrusive as injunctive actions. In Fair Assessment
in Real Estate v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177, 184 (1981), for example, the Court observed that
the determination necessary for a damages award in a § 1983 challenge to a state taxing
scheme "would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by principles
of comity."
See Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 855 (1st Cir. 1978).
" Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973).
4 See, e.g., Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983);
Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981); Ford v. Burke, 529 F. Supp. 373 (N.D.N.Y.
1982). See generally Developments, supra note 87, at 1340-41.
1 The hypothesized suit for damages would comport with the view that fourth amendment
violations are better remedied through civil redress than through application of the
exclusionary rule. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 421-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(fourth amendment violation does not impugn integrity of fact-finding process and should
not be basis for federal habeas corpus relief where defendant had opportunity to litigate
issue in state court).
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The widespread disagreement over the preclusive effect of a prior state
criminal conviction on unlitigated issues '56 has intensified in the wake of
Allen. The lower court decisions reveal an especial confusion on the
question of applicable law. In most pre-Allen decisions which addressed
questions of preclusion following a state criminal conviction, the courts
assumed that the question was governed by federal law and did not
mention the potential applicability of section 1738.' 5' Several courts, for
example, devised the rule that a federal action following a state court
conviction is barred if the federal suit calls into question the elements
of the crime or the constitutionality of the conviction.'58 Such a rule is
typically based on the rationale that habeas corpus is the sole federal
remedy available when the claim, although styled as a request for
damages, would undermine the integrity of the state court conviction."5 9
That rationale rests on the federal court's power to enforce statutory
restrictions on federal remedies and does not depend on the rendering
state's res judicata law.
In addition, the courts have sometimes applied a theory of estoppel,
presumably arising under federal law, to bar the assertion of issues not
previously litigated in a prior criminal proceeding.6 ' The question arises
most typically in the context of a prior guilty plea. The theory, which
1" See generally Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IowA L. REv. 281,
295 (1980).
157 See, e.g., Fulford v. Kline, 529 F.2d 377 (1976), adhered to on reh'g en banc, 550 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1977); Brazell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States,
441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971); Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
15 See, e.g., Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981); Brazell v. Adams, 493 F.2d
489 (5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971); Hooper
v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975). But see Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d
848 (1st Cir. 1978) (because of high value placed on individual liberty, state criminal defendant
should not be barred from raising constitutional claims not previously litigated in criminal
proceeding).
15 The Fifth Circuit has provided the most explicit articulation of such a rationale. See
Fulford v. Kline, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (1977) (federal
action which alleged prosecution had withheld exculpatory evidence at trial was barred
as going to constitutionality of conviction); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976),
adhered to en bane, 550 F.2d 345, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977) (federal action which alleg-
ed coercion and bribery of witness, resulting in involuntary guilty plea, was barred as
going to constitutionality of conviction). Accord Delaney v. Giarrusso, 633 F.2d 1126 (5th
Cir. 1981). Apart from the question of appropriate remedy, the Fifth Circuit has noted
in a post-Allen decision that collateral estoppel has no application where a state criminal
defendant has not actually litigated a particular issue. In Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d
366, 374 (1981), the court observed that collateral estoppel does not apply to a situation
"where, although certain illegal or unconstitutional acts against a criminal defendant may
have occurred, the defendant has chosen not to place those acts in issue in the trial of
his case."
160 See, e.g., Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Similarly, in Palma
v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the court treated the defendant's failure to
raise a fourth amendment objection in a state criminal trial as tantamount to a waiver
and gave the waiver preclusive effect in a later federal civil rights action. Such a theory
of waiver, which presupposes full incentive to raise the issue in the criminal action, has
been questioned. See Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1982; cf. supra note 133.
[Vol. 58:59
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
should be viewed as an estoppel against inconsistent positions'6' rather
than an expanded version of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, 6' holds
that the defendant's plea is an admission not only of the elements of the
crime but also of the legality of the state's conduct. Such a theory is akin
to a federal common law of evidence,"3 and, again, does not rely on the
rendering state's law of res judicata.
Allen's emphasis on section 1738 has created new but unnecessary
confusion over applicable law. Some courts have assumed that the full
faith and credit mandate of section 1738 controls the question of preclu-
sion of unlitigated issues following a state criminal conviction but have
misapplied the statute. In Prosise v. Haring," for example, a state court
defendant who had been convicted of a drug offense after a guilty plea
sought damages in a later federal action on the basis of an alleged fourth
amendment violation.'6 ' Assuming section 1738 to apply, the Fourth Cir-
cuit initially looked to state law to determine the preclusive effect of the
guilty plea. Although the court found no case on point in the courts of
the rendering state, it noted a general reluctance in those courts to app-
ly preclusion after a criminal action. The Fourth Circuit therefore for-
mulated "a flat rule of non-preclusion" with respect to search and seizure
issues in guilty plea cases.'66 The court seemed to be announcing a rule
of general applicability for future federal cases arising in that circuit. Such
a rule would presuppose authority to fashion a federal law of preclusion
without regard to section 1738. On the other hand, the court reiterated
that its general rule "is conformable under 28 U.S.C. S 1738 to Virginia
decisions" '67 and thus implied that the rule may have applicability only
in federal cases relating to prior guilty pleas in the Virginia courts. Hence,
1"1 See 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra note 61, 0A05 [8], at 771 (distinguishing estop-
pel against inconsistent positions from res judicata and suggesting that former is govern-
ed by federal standards when federAl issues are involved).
'M See Vestal, supra note 133, at 478-83, where the argument for such a view of collateral
estoppel is advanced. Professor Vestal contends that unlitigated issues, such as potential
fourth amendment defenses in guilty plea cases, should be precluded if there was an op-
portunity and a sufficient incentive to litigate the issues in the criminal proceeding. In
so urging, Professor Vestal departs from established principles of preclusion. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 (1982).
"6 See Hazard, supra note 133, at 578; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 comment
b (1982) ("A defendant who pleads guilty may be held to be estopped in subsequent civil
litigation from contesting facts representing the elements of the offense. However, under
the terms of this Restatement such an estoppel is not a matter of issue preclusion, because
the issue has not actually been litigated, but is a matter of the law of evidence beyond
the scope of this Restatement.").
4 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), affid, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983).
16 Id. at 1135.
1 Id- at 1142.
Id. The Supreme Court's affirmance did not address the validity of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's "flat rule of non-preclusion:' Rather, the Court affirmed the narrow holding that
because the fourth amendment claim would not be barred under the res judicata law of
Virginia, it was likewise not barred in federal court under § 1738. See supra note 11.
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the court's own discussion reveals a confusion regarding the applicability
and operation of section 1738.
A similar ambivalence can be seen in Ford v. Burke,"8 where a state
court defendant, following a conviction on a guilty plea, filed a damages
action in federal court challenging the constitutionality of his arrest.6 '
The court noted at the outset that "[t]he operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1738
assures that this Court accord proper deference to the state court's
findings."'"7 Then, reading Allen broadly, the court reasoned that the defen-
dant's claim should be disallowed since he had been afforded a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the fourth amendment issue in the state court."x
At no point, however, did the court actually look to the relevant state
law of preclusion; rather, the court assumed an authority to formulate
an approach independent of that which might be followed in the state
system.
Under the circumstances of Prosise and Ford, section 1738 provides
no basis for precluding the constitutional claim in federal court. The tradi-
tional doctrines of issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and concomitantly
full faith and credit, have no application in the situation under discus-
sion. Issue preclusion bars litigation only of issues which have been ac-
tually litigated and necessarily determined in the earlier proceeding.'
In contested criminal actions, Allen makes clear that litigated issues may
be held binding against the defendant, but where the defendant has chosen
not to assert a particular defense, issue preclusion by definition is
inapplicable. 3
Moreover, where a state court defendant, following conviction, seeks
to recover in federal court for an antecedent constitutional violation, the
damages action should not be barred by claim preclusion. So long as the
civil action does not include a request to set aside the judgment of con-
viction, the civil remedy and the criminal prosecution are not the same
"claim": the criminal defendant could not have asserted a claim for
damages in the criminal prosecution, and the parties in the two actions
would be different.'74 The defendant's failure to raise the collateral issue
defensively means only that the issue may not be asserted as a ground
for challenging the conviction.
Another situation involving a prior state criminal proceeding which
529 F. Supp. 373 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
1 9 Id. at 375.
,,' Id. at 376.
17 Id. at 377-79.
,72 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 27 (1982).
' See Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed at supra note 159.
.' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 85 comment a (1982); cf. Boykins v.
Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1980) (where state forum could not have
awarded damages, federal civil rights claim is different cause of action and res judicata
is no bar).
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frequently arises in the federal courts is likewise outside the scope of
section 1738. A state court defendant wishing to protect his or her right
to engage in future conduct may seek a declaratory judgment in federal
court on the constitutionality of the criminal statute under which the
defendant has already been convicted.175 If the defendant requests a
declaration of invalidity with prospective effect only, the prior judgment
of conviction will not be disturbed or undermined.'," In such a cir-
cumstance, traditional claim preclusion has no application since each viola-
tion or threatened violation of the statute would constitute a separate.
claim.7 Similarly, issue preclusion would be inapplicable so long as the
defendant had not actually litigated the constitutionality of the statute
in state court.1'78 Section 1738 requires that the judgment of conviction
be accorded conclusive effect on the question of the defendant's guilt,
but the hypothesized judgment would not have addressed the
constitutionality of the criminal statute. The federal court could therefore
"I See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975);
Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1885 (1983). See generally Developments, supra note 87, at
1340-41.
"I The Supreme Court recognized as much in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711
(1977), where it held the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to be inapplicable
to a federal action which sought only prospective relief and which was "in no way 'de-
signed to annul the results of a state trial.'" The Court stressed that the Maynards sought
only to be free from prosecutions for future violations of the same statute. Professor Cur-
rie has argued that res judicata should have barred the Maynard's federal action since
that action "dealt with future instances of conduct identical to conduct whose legality had
been litigated in state court." Currie, supra note 68, at 341. He goes on to urge a radical
restructuring of the law of preclusion.
Perhaps the time has come to abandon the unhelpful distinction between res
judicata and "collateral estoppel" and to ask simply whether the party to be
precluded had adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier
proceeding and whether the matter is closely enough related to the original
controversy so that judicial economy would be served by confining litigation
to one proceeding.
Id. at 342 (citations omitted). Professor Currie's suggestion, by placing overriding emphasis
on judicial economy, arguably distorts the core function of res judicata of ensuring the
finality of judicial determinations. There would seem to be no threat to finality by allow-
ing a state criminal defendant to withhold a claim of unconstitutionality, accept a judg-
ment of conviction, and then urge the criminal statute's invalidity in a separate federal
action solely for the purpose of protecting future conduct.
11 Cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948) (every tax year constitutes separate
cause of action).
"' Even where the issue was actually litigated, the circumstances may make the applica-
tion of preclusion particularly harsh. In Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974), the defendants were convicted of distributing
leaflets in a city park without a permit and paid a fine of ten dollars. In the course of
the prosecution the state court ruled that the permit system was constitutional. In a later
civil rights action for prospective declaratory relief, the defendants were precluded from
relitigating the question of the ordinance's constitutionality. Preclusion in such a circumstance
is required under S 1738 if the courts of the rendering state would likewise hold the defen-
dants to be bound. Often, however, the res judicata law of the rendering state will recognize
certain pertinent exceptions to the doctrine of issue preclusion which may serve to avoid
the Thistlethwaite result. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 28 (1982).
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resolve the constitutionality issue in a separate proceeding without doing
violence to the dictate of full faith and credit. '79
It is submitted, then, that the full faith and credit mandate does not
control the question of whether a federal court litigant may assert issues
which could have been but were not raised in a prior state criminal
proceeding. Acceptance of that proposition, however, does not mean that
the federal courts must open their doors to all such litigants. To the
contrary, the federal courts remain free to formulate and apply their own
law of estoppel, evidentiary presumptions, and remedies with due regard
for the policy of intersystem comity. A sense of deference toward the
state criminal proceeding may persuade some federal courts to disallow
belated civil claims based on antecedent constitutional violations;"s others
may place greater value on the complainant's need for a forum for civil
redress."' Alternatively, an emphasis on judicial economy may lead the
courts to bar even prospective challenges to state statutes where the
challenge could have been raised earlier. The point here is that the federal
courts are not acting under the compulsion of section 1738 in such cir-
cumstances, but are instead applying their own law according to
independent federal policies.
Statutory Exceptions
The teaching of Allen and Kremer is that the federal courts should not
infer a statutory exception to section 1738 unless Congress has clearly
manifested its intent to depart from the full faith and credit mandate."
The specific holdings in each case illustrate the heavy burden on a litigant
wishing to escape the preclusive effect of a prior state court determina-
tion. Persuasive arguments were available that Congress had intended
to ensure a litigant's access to federal court under section 1983 and Title
... Accord Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive in Section 1983 Litigation in the
Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 185, 208-09 (1974).
" E.g., Ford v. Burke, 529 F. Supp. 373 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp.
924, 935-36 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Of course, the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
may bar access to the federal forum if the state litigant seeks federal relief before the
conclusion of the state court proceedings, even if such relief is only declaratory. See Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Moreover, some lower courts have invoked the Younger doc-
trine to bar damage claims arising out of a pending criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Martin
v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976).
"' In Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 855 (1st Cir. 1978), for example,
the court reasoned:
[T]o bar all claims that might have been raised in a criminal trial forces the
criminal defendant to the uncomfortable choice between, on the one hand,
possibly alienating the trial judge, particularly when the judge's own procedures
are questioned, and delaying trial, and, on the other, foregoing his constitu-
tional claim.
" Allen v. McCurry 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 1883, 1895 (1982).
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VII, but in Allen and Kremer the Court found that clearer evidence of
legislative intent would be required to recognize a partial repeal of section
1738. The underlying theme of the Court's discussion in each case was
that Congress, in enacting the pertinent statutory scheme, had not
deprived the state courts of their concurrent jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine the relevant issues."' Conversely, in the two contexts in which the
Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to full faith and credit-habeas
corpus" and bankruptcy"'l-the federal courts assume a unique role,
exclusive of the states, under the applicable statutes.
It would seem, then, that where Congress has not disturbed the residual
power of the state courts to hear a particular claim or issue, the rendering
state's law of res judicata should determine whether the state court judg-
ment should be binding in a later federal court action. The critical inquiry
in assessing the validity of an alleged statutory exception to section 1738
is whether concurrent jurisdiction exists on the particular question. If
jurisdiction in the state court remains, that jurisdiction means power to
render a binding determination.
Section 1983
Section 1983 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and
state courts 86 and therefore is presumptively controlled by the ordinary
operation of full faith and credit." A number of federal courts have never-
theless recognized a limited section 1983 exception to full faith and credit
by permitting federal court litigants to assert constitutional claims which
could have been but were not actually litigated in a prior state court
action.'88 Some courts, endorsing a choice-of-forum theory, have
distinguished between voluntary and involuntary state court litigants and
have recognized a claim preclusion exception only for litigants who were
defendants in the earlier state court action."' The rationale for the section
"I Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1894 ("It is sufficiently clear that Congress ... though wary
of assuming the adequacy of state employment discrimination remedies, did not intend
to supplant such laws"); Allen, 449 U.S. at 99 (in enacting S 1983, "Congress was adding
to the jurisidiction of the federal courts, not subtracting from that of the state courts").
See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
" See 28 U.S.C. % 1331, 1343(3) (1976); cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (suit
for violation of federal statute may be brought as civil rights action under § 1983 in state
court). Ironically, by expanding the scope of § 1983 to include many federal statutory claims,
but cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the decision in
Thiboutot may undermine the argument that Congress, in enacting S 1983, assigned to the
federal courts a paramount role in protecting federal constitutional rights.
" See Currie, supra note 68, at 328.
" See, e.g., Garguil v. Tompkins, 704 F.2d 661 (2d. Cir. 1983); New Jersey Ed. Ass'n
v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Lombard v. Board of Ed.,
502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975).
"I See Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1978); Brown v. Chastain, 416
F.2d 1012, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rives, J., dissenting).
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1983 exception, however circumscribed, has been typically expressed as
a function of the primary role of the federal courts in protecting federal
constitutional rights.'' But Allen's emphatic rejection of the notion that
a civil rights claimant has an absolute right to a federal forum undercuts
the argument that a state court litigant is entitled to withhold a civil
rights claim so as to ensure access to the federal court. If the policies
underlying section 1983 are insufficient to prevent the application of issue
preclusion, there would seem to be no reason for treating the question
of claim preclusion differently.
The proponents of a claim preclusion exception for section 1983 claims
generally rely on two Supreme Court decisions: Monroe v. Pape,' and
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.'9 In light of Allen,
neither Monroe nor England provides solid support for the purported
exception. The Monroe Court recognized that section 1983 was enacted
in part because of the perceived inadequacy of state court remedies.
9 3
In Allen that motive was translated into the principle that a prior state
court judgment should be binding unless the state court proceeding did
not afford a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim.
Under Kremer, moreover, the "full and fair opportunity" was equated
with the minimum requirements of procedural due process. Hence, section
1983, as interpreted in Monroe and reinterpreted in Allen, does not sup-
port an exception to claim preclusion based on a presumed inadequacy
of the state courts. Rather, the state proceeding in which the litigant
might have raised the federal claim must be shown to have been
inadequate in fact in order for the litigant to escape the operation of claim
preclusion.
On the other hand, a passage from Monroe that was not addressed in
Allen provides superficial support for the limited section 1983 exception
to full faith and credit. In holding that a section 1983 claimant need not
exhaust state judicial remedies, the Monroe Court explained that "[t]he
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
1" The basic argument was forcefully articulated by the Third Circuit in New Jersey
Ed. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 774, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978):
To hold that state court litigation bars a federal forum from deciding any
claims which might have been raised before the state court would turn the
state court into quicksand. It would not only serve as a trap for unwary plaintiffs
who desire a federal tribunal, but encourage competently represented litigants
to forego any venture into state jurisdiction to exhaust state administrative
and judicial procedures on pain of losing their right to a federal hearing.
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion), ajfd, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982), the court assumed that Burke
was still good law even after Allen. But see Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d
Cir. 1981) (suggesting that Burke should be limited to the abstention context), discussed
infra at note 201.
191 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
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not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.194 In
reliance on that language, lower courts have reasoned by analogy that
the federal claim need not be first asserted in state court before being
advanced in federal court.'95 The Monroe statement, however, must be
read in context. The Court was at that point considering whether the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under section 1983. Specifically
addressing the question of state action, the Court rejected the argument
that a state officer's conduct, if violative of state law, could not be deemed
"under color" of state law for purposes of section 1983.19 The Court
determined that "under color" of state law included conduct taken under
the cloak of official authority whether or not such conduct was in
accordance with applicable state statutes." The Court therefore concluded
that a litigant need not first obtain a state court's imprimatur on the
challenged conduct in order to establish the requisite state action. The
Court did not even consider the possibility of successive state and federal
challenges. Hence, the rule of nonexhaustion does not speak to the
situation which activates claim preclusion- where the would-be federal
litigant has already sought redress in state court."9 ' In short, those who
rely on the nonexhaustion rule of Monroe to support an exception to claim
preclusion are applying the holding out of context and imputing to the
rule a meaning not intended by the Court.199
An alternative argument in 'support of the section 1983 exception
derives from the England holding that a state court judgment is conclusive
of a federal constitutional claim only if the litigant freely and unreservedly
submitted the federal claim for decision in the state court. Advocates
194 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
191 See, e.g., Lombard v. Board of Ed., 502 F.2d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 976 (1975).
19 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 181-83.
" Id. at 182-87.
Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609-10 n.21 (1975) (requirement of exhaustion
of appellate remedies is not inconsistent with Monroe since Monroe "had nothing to do
with the problem ... of the deference to be accorded state proceedings which have already
been initiated and which afford a competent tribunal for the resolution of federal issues.").
" The nonexhaustion rule recognized in Monroe is not a unique attribute of S 1983 claims.
In general, a federal court litigant need not exhaust state judicial remedies. Bacon v. Rutland
R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914). Indeed, in light of the full faith and credit mandate, the imposition
of a general rule requiring exhaustion of state judicial remedies would repeal the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts. The fact that the rule of nonexhaustion is not unique to 5
1983 undercuts the argument that such a rule somehow marks the civil rights statute as
special. To the contrary, a statute which affirmatively requires exhaustion of state judicial
remedies is more susceptible of a construction that Congress intended to create an exception
to full faith and credit, at least with regard to issue preclusion. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)
(1976); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973). The recently reaffirmed rule that
S 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies, Patsy v. Board of Regents,
102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982), likewise lends no support to the argument for a claim preclusion
exception. Indeed, the Court in Patsy noted that an exhaustion requirement would raise
difficult res judicata questions. Id. at 2567.
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of the claim preclusion exception for section 1983 have contended that
at least involuntary litigants in state court should be allowed to withhold
their federal claims for later assertion in federal court as a function of
choice of forum."'
The choice of forum rationale does not survive Allen's narrow construc-
tion of the England doctrine. The Allen Court made clear that England's
recognition of the right to reserve a federal claim in state court was
confined to the context of an abstention order."1 Allen indicates that an
attempted reservation or withholding of a federal claim, outside the
abstention context, would be improper. Moreover, the choice of forum
argument is, at core, another version of the theory rejected in Allen that
everyone has the right to litigate a federal constitutional claim in federal
court.
Claim preclusion by definition denies a choice of forum to defendants
who might prefer to litigate their defenses elsewhere; section 1738 extends
the doctrine to an intersystem context. The operation of claim preclusion
may seem particularly Draconian where a litigant is foreclosed from
asserting a federal civil rights claim that was omitted from an earlier
state court proceeding. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made clear in
Allen that the state judiciary is fully competent to render binding
determinations on such claims. Since Congress has not vested exclusive
jurisdiction over civil rights claims in the federal courts or otherwise
lessened the effect of state court proceedings in civil rights cases, there
is no basis for reading a section 1983 exception into the full faith and
credit mandate.2
See, e.g., Theis, supra note 87; Developments, supra note 87, at 1342-43.
0 See supra note 100. The applicability of the England doctrine to the various categories
of abstention orders is problematic. The Supreme Court has strongly implied that the reser-
vation technique is available only where abstention is invoked pursuant to Railroad Comm'n
v. Pdllman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and not in the context of abstention under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977). Indeed, allowing a
reservation of a federal claim would make little sense under Younger since the result of
a Younger abstention order is dismissal, rather than postponement, of the federal lawsuit,
and such an abstention order presupposes an adequate opportunity to raise the constitu-
tional claim in the state court. The confusion surrounding these doctrines is illustrated
by two cases from the Third Circuit. In New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978), simultaneous state and federal actions were brought
challenging various educational regulations, and the district court dismissed the federal
suit under Younger. While appeal to the Third Circuit was pending, the state action ter-
minated in an order sustaining the regulations. The court of appeals held that (1) the district
court had improperly dismissed the federal action, and (2) the plaintiffs were not barred
by their failure to have raised their constitutional claims in state court. As to its second
holding, the court relied in part on the England doctrine. In Switlik v. Hardwicke Co.,
651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1981), involving a duplicative S 1983 action following an unsuccessful
state court suit, the plaintiffs asserted Burke as precedent. The Third Circuit, rather than
relying on the fact that the plaintiffs in Switlik had actually litigated their federal claims
in state court, distinguished Burke and England as cases involving "abstention." The court
thus overlooked the different category of abstention order involved in each case and the
fact that Burke had held abstention inappropriate.
2 At least two courts have concluded on the basis of Allen and Kremer that other civil
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Exclusive Jurisdiction
Claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts are, by
definition, outside the normal presumption of state court competence since
Congress has deprived the state courts of their normal residual
jurisdiction.213 In general, the legislative motives for granting the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction include a desire for uniformity in the inter-
pretation and enforcement of a federal statutory scheme, a belief that
only the federal courts can provide the needed expertise, and the fear
that error in the state courts is unusually likely.
0 4
The operation of res judicata and full faith and credit in the exclusive
jurisdiction context has given rise to a body of inconsistent case law2 5
and considerable commentary.0 0 The controversy for the most part has
rights statutes apart from § 1983 are not statutory exceptions to 5 1738 for purposes of
claim preclusion. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)); Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976)).
"' Exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts is the exception, and exclusivity will not
be inferred unless there is an express provision to that effect, an unmistakable implication
from leglislative history, or a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and
federal interests. E.g., Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981); Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962). See generally D. CURRIE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 376 (1975). The understanding of the Framers was that the
state courts would maintain their general jurisdiction and would not be excluded from
hearing federal claims except in the unusual case. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
Exclusivity has been expressly provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty, maritime, and
prize), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1338 (patent and copyright), 1346(b) (tort suits against United
States), 1351 (actions against consuls), 1355 (federal penalty or forfeiture), 1356 (seizures
not within admiralty or maritime); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 18
U.S.C. § 3231 (criminal actions); 40 U.S.C. § 270b (suits on government contractors' bonds).
Exclusivity has been implied under, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (taxpayer suit for refund); 15
U.S.C. § 15, 26 (antitrust).
20 See D. CURRIE, supra note 203, at 376. Although each grant of exclusive jurisdiction
should be examined separately to ascertain the particular legislative motive, legislative
hearings and debates are often not helpful in revealing the purpose and intended scope
of the jurisdictional grant. See, e.g., In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 427 F. Supp.
1211, 1219, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Note, Exclusive Jurisidiction of the Federal Courts in Private
Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV., 509, 511-14 (1957). For purposes of this discussion it will
be assumed that the two basic motives underlying a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion are the desire for uniformity in the interpretation and enforcement of the federal
statute, and the desire for development of federal expertise.
"I On the question of issue preclusion, compare Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222
F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (grant of exclusive jurisdiction immunizes
federal action from application of collateral estoppel), with Azalea Drive-In Theater, Inc.
v. Hanft, 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977) (grant of exclusive
jurisdiction does not bar ordinary operation of issue preclusion); Granader v. Public Bank,
417 F.2d 75, 81 (6th Cir. 1969) (same); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d
510, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) (same). On the question of claim
preclusion, compare Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 982-85 (5th Cir. 1979) (state court
suit did not preclude federal action because state court lacked jurisdiction to consider alleged
federal violations), with Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964) (dismissal
of state antitrust suit bars federal action).
2 See, e.g., Einhorn & Gray, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Determinations in Federal
Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 J. CORP. L. 235 (1978); Comment,
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surrounded the question of issue preclusion. Because state courts have
long been recognized as competent to decide defenses arising under
exclusive jurisdiction statutes,"' a state court's determination of such a
defense is frequently the subject of a plea of collateral estoppel in a later
federal court action. For example, in a state-law contract action the
defendant may defend on the ground that the contract was illegal under
the federal antitrust laws. If the state court sustains the defense, the
defendant may then pursue affirmative relief under the antitrust laws
in federal court and seek to invoke collateral estoppel offensively on the
antitrust question. Alternatively, if the defendant loses in state court but
still files for affirmative relief in federal court, issue preclusion will be
asserted defensively. In either situation, the federal court must decide
whether Congress in enacting the exclusive jurisdiction statute intended
to relax the full faith and credit requirement so as to divest the state
court findings of their normal binding effect.
Although it has been argued that to give collateral estoppel effect to
state court findings in such a situation would undermine the congressional
policy of exclusivity, 8 the Supreme Court has indicated that full preclusive
effect should be accorded actual state court determinations of fact and
law, even where the determination involves matters within exclusive
federal court jurisdiction. In Becher v. Contoure Laboratories," a prior
Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Court Judgments in Federal Antitrust Suits, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 955 (1963); Note, Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases
Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Collateral Estoppel Note]; Comment, Exclusive Federal Court Jurisdiction and State Judgment
Finality-the Dilemma Facing the Federal Courts, 10 SETON HAL L. REV. 848 (1980); Note,
Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determina-
tions, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Res Judicata Note].
217 The principle was recognized in Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co, 168 U.S. 255
(1897), where the Court held that a state court had properly considered evidence that plain-
tiffs patent infringed prior patents in the context of a state-law contract suit. The Court
reasoned that the jurisdictional statute "does not deprive the state courts of the power
to determine questions arising under the patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction
of cases arising under those laws." Id. at 259 (emphasis in original). Accord Hathorn v. Lovorn,
102 S. Ct. 2421 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
' See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The best known exposition of such a view is Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Lyons v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
Westinghouse brought suit in state court against Lyons for breach of contract, and Lyons
raised the defense that the contract violated the federal antitrust laws. The state court
ultimately rejected the defense and held for Westinghouse. While the state appeal was
pending, Lyons filed an antitrust action against Westinghouse in federal court. The federal
court stayed proceedings pending resolution of the state suit on the apparent assumption
that a final state court determination on the antitrust issues would be preclusive in federal
court. The Second Circuit rejected that assumption and issued a writ of mandamus ordering
the district court to vacate the stay. Judge Hand reasoned that "the grant to the district
courts of exclusive jurisdiction ... should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions
from any prejudgment elsewhere; at least on occasions, like those at bar, where the putative
estoppel includes the whole nexus of facts that makes up the wrong." Id. at 189.
m 279 U.S. 388 (1929).
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state court action had determined that Becher had breached an agreement
of confidentiality and wrongfully obtained a patent on a machine invented
by his employer. After the state court decreed an assignment of the patent
to the employer, Becher brought suit for patent infringement against the
employer in clear contravention of the state court judgment.1 The
Supreme Court held that the facts established in the state court action
were binding in the patent infringement suit."' In his brief opinion for
the Court, Justice Holmes stressed that the state court had been acting
fully within its jurisdiction and that the state court action arose wholly
under state law. Justice Holmes then turned to the impact of the state
court findings on the later suit for infringement:
That decrees validating or invalidating patents belong to the courts
of the United States does not give sacrosanctity to facts that may
be conclusive upon the question in issue. A fact is not prevented from
being proved in any case in which it is material, by the suggestion
that if it is true an important patent is void ... .11
Some authorities have read Becher as limited to questions of historical
or incidental fact 3 The rightful ownership of the patent was, however,
a mixed question of fact and law, albeit state law, and indeed was deter-
minative of the ultimate issue of the patent's validity. A better reading
of Becher would seem to be that factual and legal determinations made
by a state court are presumptively binding in a later action in federal
court so long as the state court had jurisdiction to make the determina-
tions. Such a presumption is supported by the view that the fundamental
goal of section 1738 is to ensure the conclusiveness of actual state court
determinations.214 The presumption may be overcome by a showing of a
specific statutory repeal of the issue preclusion component of full faith
and credit. Becher makes clear that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
alone is not a sufficient basis for inferring such a repeal. 15
211 Id. at 390.
"' Id. at 391-92.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 188 (1955), where the court
distinguished Becher on the ground that in Becher collateral estoppel was applied to "one
of the constituent facts that together [made] up a claim," not to "the entire congeries of
such facts, taken as a unit." The attempted distinction fails to note that Becher's applica-
tion of collateral estoppel involved more than incidental facts. Becher's infringement claim
was effectively precluded by the state court judgment. The distinction has been criticized
by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d
484, 491 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 359 (1981); 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra
note 61, 0.455, at 4113-14; Developments, supra note 87, at 1335 n.20; Collateral Estoppel
Note, supra note 206, at 1283-85; Res Judicata Note, supra note 206, at 1367-69.
21, See supra notes 53, 141-42 and accompanying text.
Accord, Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968) (state shareholders
derivative suit did not preclude federal action under Securities Exchange Act, but facts
determined in state action were binding in federal court); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable
Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.. 1956) (state court determination that licensee's activity was
not infringement of plaintiffs patent was conclusive of issue of infringement in plaintiffs
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Kremer likewise supports the view that issue preclusion operates fully
in a state-to-federal context even where the later action is within exclusive
federal jurisdiction. In Kremer, the Court expressly left open the ques-
tion of whether the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Title
VII claims.216 Because the Court went on to hold that the state court's
rejection of Kremer's discrimination claim was entitled to full faith and
credit in the federal court, it can be inferred that the presence of ex-
clusive jurisdiction would not have altered the result.21 Indeed, Kremer
establishes that section 1738 is fully operative unless Congress indicates
an unmistakable intention to the contrary. The Court's deferral of the
jurisdictional question under Title VII indicates that a grant of exclusive
jurisdiction, without more, will not automatically be deemed a repeal of
section 1738, at least with respect to issue preclusion.218
In contrast, a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction should be presumed
to create an exception to the claim preclusion component of section 1738.219
Allen and Kremer require that Congress "clearly manifest its intent to
depart from § 1738";' ° a grant of exclusive jurisdiction provides such a
manifestation with regard to the doctrines of merger and bar. The question
of claim preclusion typically arises in the following way. When federal
and state statutes provide similar remedies for the same conduct and the
federal statute is within exclusive federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff may first
seek relief in state court under state law and later appear in federal court
later infringement suit in federal court); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio
1959) (state court determination that corporate director had not breached duty of disclosure
under state law was conclusive of issue whether director breached similar duty under SEC
rule 10b-5 in later federal action).
Several commentators have espoused a choice-of-forum approach to the question of issue
preclusion in the exclusive jurisdiction context. The argument is that a state court litigant
should not be bound by a determination on matters within exclusive federal court jurisdic-
tion unless the litigant voluntarily sought out the state forum. See, e.g., Collateral Estoppel
Note, supra note 206, at 1290-94; Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction over Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 936, 966-68 (1971). This approach overlooks the principle that the state courts have
been deemed competent to decide federal defenses based on exclusive jurisdiction statutes.
If the state courts are deemed competent to determine particular issues, then their
determinations should be entitled to the usual finality. See Currie, supra note 68, at 347.
The question would seem better resolved by according full preclusive effect to actual state
determinations while invoking the choice-of-forum rationale in cases where the state court
litigant has withheld the federal defense. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
21' Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1896 n.20. The lower courts are in disagreement on the question
of Title VII's jurisdictional status. See supra note 112.
II? Kremer implicitly rejected the view that collateral estoppel operates only as to state
court determinations of historic fact. The state court determination in Kremer incorporated
the basic factual and legal question at issue in the federal proceedings.
219 Accord, Hathorn v. Lovorn, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2430 n.23 (1982) (dicta) (in recognizing
state court power to collaterally decide issues of preclearance under Voting Rights Act,
Court suggests that common notions of issue preclusion would obtain in such a context).
29 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); see also supra notes 72-79 and accompanying
text.
Allen, 449 U.S. at 96-99; Kremer, 102 S. Ct. at 1894-95.
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under the federal statute. In such a circumstance, a defense of claim
preclusion might be asserted on the theory that the state and federal
actions constituted the same claim."2
Under standard section 1738 analysis, the federal court would be
compelled to dismiss the federal action if the state's law of res judicata
so required.' However, the literal directive of section 1738-that a state
court judgment be accorded the same effect in federal court as it would
have in the courts of the rendering state-should not be followed when
the second action is within exclusive federal jurisdiction and the specific
res judicata problem is claim preclusion. The state courts will rarely have
addressed the preclusive effect of a state law claim on a later action within
exclusive federal jurisdiction.' Moreover, it would seem institutionally
inappropriate to look to state law to characterize, for res judicata purposes,
a claim within exclusive federal jurisdiction. The grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction is necessarily an indication of a strong federal interest in
uniformity in the interpretation and enforcement of the pertinent federal
statutory scheme. 4 Federal court adherence to the res judicata law of
each individual state could result in an inconsistency among the federal
courts in their treatment of claims which are their exclusive prerogative.'
1' See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 359 (1982) (consent judgment in favor of plaintiff's privy in state antitrust suit
precluded plaintiffs federal antitrust action against same defendant); cf. Engelhardt v. Bell
& Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964) (dismissal of prior state antitrust action, after
removal to federal court on diversity grounds, barred federal antitrust action by same
party). Of course, if the plaintiff is the losing party in the state court action, a later federal
suit may be effectively barred by the operation of issue preclusion without regard to the
doctrine of claim preclusion.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (1982); see generally supra notes 48-49
and accompanying text.
"I State courts would have little reason to consider such a question since they lack power
to enjoin relitigation in federal court on res judicata grounds. See Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408 (1964).
221 See Collateral Estoppel Note, supra note 206, at 1281-82.
"I Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261 (1980), supports by analogy the view that exclusive jurisdiction statutes create an ex-
ception to the claim preclusion component of full faith and credit. In Thomas the plurality
held that the full faith and credit requirement did not bar a supplemental award to the
petitioner under the workmen's compensation laws of the District of Columbia even though
the petitioner's prior recovery of benefits in Virginia excluded as a matter of Virginia
law any other recovery. The core of Justice Stevens' reasoning is revealed in the following
passage:
ITihe Virginia Commission could and did establish the full measure of peti-
tioner's rights under Virginia law, but it neither could nor purported to deter-
mine his rights under the law of the District of Columbia. Full faith and credit
must be given to the determination that the Virginia Commission had the
authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need
not be given to determinations that it had no power to make. Since it was
not requested, and had no authority, to pass on petitioner's rights under District
of Columbia law, there can be no constitutional objection to a fresh adjudica-
tion of those rights.
Id. at 282-83. Thus, while the issue preclusion component of S 1738 may be fully applicable
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The "might have been litigated" aspect of claim preclusion poses an
additional problem. Because of the posited exclusive federal jurisdiction,
a federal court in a second action could never conclude that the federal
claim might have been litigated in state court. 6 A countervailing practical
argument is that the plaintiff in the hypothetical could have filed originally
in federal court and asserted the state law claim as a pendent claim,
thereby raising all theories of relief in one litigation.22 ' Although such
an approach would serve the general res judicata goal of judicial economy
by encouraging litigants to present their entire controversies in a single
proceeding, this approach surely is not compelled by full faith and credit.
Indeed, the courts which have embraced such an argument have done
so as a matter of a purely federal doctrine of res judicata.' Although
it may be sound policy under certain circumstances to bar a claim within
exclusive federal jurisdiction,2" the federal court should be free to
formulate the policy as a matter of federal law.
in an intersystem context, the question of claim preclusion is distinct: a court within one
judicial system cannot preclude the assertion of a claim in another system where the first
system lacks the power to resolve the claim in question. The analogy to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion context is obvious and, indeed, was noted by Justice Stevens. See id. at 283 n.29.
The new Restatement recognizes as much.
The general rule [of merger and bar] is largely predicated on the assumption
that the jurisdiction in which the first judgment was rendered was one which
put no formal barriers in the way of the litigant's presenting to a court in
one action the entire claim including any theories of recovery or demands
for relief that might have been available to him under applicable law. When
such formal barriers in fact existed and were operative against a plaintiff in
the first action, it is unfair to preclude him from the second action in which
he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from presenting
in the first.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 26 comment c (1982).
Decisions holding that a federal court judgment on an exclusive jurisdiction claim precludes
a state court action on a similar state law claim are not apposite. Where an exclusive jurisdic-
tion claim is filed, the plaintiff has the option of asserting a related state law claim through
an invocation of pendent jurisdiction; hence, the "might have been litigated" standard of
claim preclusion would be satisfied. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Ct, 35 Cal. App.
3d 676, 680, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah
1974); cf. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1980) (state law action remov-
ed to federal court as disguised federal antitrust action was subject to dismissal on res
judicata grounds since plaintiffs had previously filed and lost identical federal antitrust
suit). See generally Note, The Res Judicata Implications of Pendent Jurisdiction, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 608 (1981). Moreover, when a federal court renders the initial judgment, the
problem is generally one of res judicata and not full faith and credit. Stoll v. Gottleib,
305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938).
' See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 51 U.S.L.W. 2297 (7th
Cir. 1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra. note 5, 5 4470, at 687.
11 See, e.g., Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 359 (1982), where the court alluded to the mandate of S 1738 but then
applied a federal law of res judicata to determine the preclusive effect of a state court
consent judgment on a later federal antitrust action.
For example, where the state court plaintiff has obtained a favorable judgment, denying
the plaintiff the right to seek additional relief under a statute within exclusive federal
jurisdiction would serve the policy of avoidance of duplicative recovery. See Nash County
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The suggested claim preclusion exception is more problematic in the
context of an omitted defense. Where a state court defendant has a
potential defense based on the plaintiff's violation of a federal statute
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the defendant's failure to assert such
a defense might lead to a plea of res judicata if the defendant later
attempts to sue for affirmative relief in federal court under the same
statute. Assume, for example, that an action based on a brokerage con-
tract is filed in state court and that purely state law defenses are raised.
After the plaintiff-broker recovers judgment, the defendant sues the same
opponent in federal court and contends that the contract violated the
federal securities laws. As damages the federal court plaintiff seeks, in
part, recovery of moneys paid pursuant to the state court judgment' 0
In such a situation the federal court suit may have the result of
nullifying rights established by the state court judgment; thus, the full
faith and credit statute is clearly implicated." Nevertheless, the suggested
exception for claim preclusion should still obtain. Although congressional
motives for granting exclusive jurisdiction under different statutes vary,
any grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction is, at the least, an indication
that Congress prefers the federal forum for resolution of the particular
claim. In order to vindicate that preference, the state -court defendant
must be free to choose to litigate the federal issues in federal court. 2
Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 359
(1982). Of course, that policy presupposes that the same remedies would be available under
the state statute as under federal law. Id. at 490, 492. In Marrese v. American Academy
of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 51 U.S.L.W. 2297 (7th Cir. 1982), where the court disallowed
plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims on res judicata grounds, the basic requirement of identical
or comparable remedies was violated. There the plaintiffs had previously lost a state court
proceeding challenging the same conduct by defendants under state common law. Noting
that the plaintiffs could have raised a state antitrust claim in their state court action, the
court concluded that the state and federal actions involved the same claim, notwithstanding
a material difference in remedies under the state and federal statutes. The court rationalized
the result in terms of efficiency and judicial economy, but such goals would seem subordinate
to the litigants' right to seek the unique relief available under federal law.
" The facts, if transposed to the antitrust context, parallel those in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-
Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). Professor Currie has argued that the plea of res judicata
in such circumstances should be sustained. Currie, supra note 68, at 347. It is contended
here that while preclusion may be warranted as a matter of sound res judicata policy,
the federal courts should be free of the mandate of S 1738 in formulating that policy.
Somewhat different considerations are raised if the state court defendant goes immediately
to federal court to assert the federal law contention offensively. Ideally, in such a
circumstance the state court would voluntarily stay its proceedings pending resolution by
the federal court of the federal issue. A voluntary postponement in state court would not
only avoid a waste of the state court's resources but would also serve the policy of inter-
system comity. On the other hand, if the federal court, rather than the state court, were
to stay its proceedings, difficult questions of res judicata and full faith and credit would
be squarely raised. See Will v. Calvert Fire. Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674 (1978) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
1' See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932), discussed at supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text.
2 The rationale for the choice-of-forum theory was well-presented by Justice Stevens'
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In other words, the choice-of-forum theory, while unavailable in civil rights
cases' because of the basic fact of concurrent jurisdiction, can be soundly
applied in the exclusive jurisdiction context because Congress has by
definition clearly manifested a preference for the federal forum.
Recognition of the claim preclusion exception to section 1738 under
exclusive jurisdiction statutes should not signal a wholesale refusal by
the federal courts to give any effect to prior state court proceedings.
Rather, the exception would merely free the federal courts to fashion
a federal doctrine of claim preclusion in the exclusive jurisdiction context.
The definition of a cause of action, the concept of privity, and other par-
ticulars of the doctrine could be formulated with due regard for the
competing policies of the exclusive jurisdiction statute, res judicata, and
intersystem comity.
CONCLUSION
Allen and Kremer together resolved several issues which had perplexed
the lower courts regarding the operation of full faith and credit in the
federal/state context. The decisions reestablished the central role of section
1738 in determining the effects of state court proceedings in later federal
court actions. At the same time, the decisions severely curtailed the
federal courts' authority to recognize exceptions to the statutory mandate.
The Court made clear that neither section 1983 nor Title VII constitutes
such an exception, at least with respect to the issue preclusion component
of full faith and credit. Moreover, Kremer established that the rule of
section 1738 controls unless the state court litigation failed to satisfy a
minimal standard of procedural due process.
On the other hand, the Court did not address the operation of claim
preclusion in the state-to-federal context; ironically, the decisions in Allen
and Kremer may cause that doctrine to be called into question with
increasing frequency. Litigants seeking to avoid binding determinations
of federal law in state court may withhold their federal claims with the
expectation of securing an unencumbered hearing on the question in
federal court. The federal courts' response to such tactics should be neither
blanket rejection nor blind acquiescence. The courts should instead analyze
each situation to ascertain at the outset the applicability of section 1738.
Such an analysis should include examination of the rendering state's law
dissenting opinion in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 664 (1977):
Since the state courts do not have the power to award complete relief for
an antitrust violation, since state judges are unfamiliar with the complexities
of this area of the law, and since state procedures are sometimes unsatisfactory
for cases of nationwide scope, no adverse inference should be drawn from a
state-court defendant's election to reserve his federal antitrust claim for decision
by a federal court.
See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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of res judicata with due regard for the full faith and credit goals of comity,
finality of judgments, and repose. In many situations the state's doctrine
of claim preclusion will bar the federal action. In some cases, however,
particularly when prior criminal proceedings are involved, the federal
action may not contradict actual determinations of the state court or
disturb the finality of the judgment. It has been argued here that in such
cases full faith and credit should be deemed inapplicable.
Allen and Kremer have left little room for the recognition of implied
statutory exceptions to full faith and credit. In light of Allen's interpreta-
tion of section 1983 and the Court's emphasis on the presumed competence
of the state courts in constitutional matters, there is no basis for
recognizing a section 1983 exception to the claim preclusion component
of full faith and credit. Indeed, the only situation in which the parity of
state and federal courts cannot be presumed is where Congress has vested
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. In these cases, Congress has
unambiguously manifested a preference for the federal forum. Under sec-
tion 1738 analysis that preference should translate into an exception to
claim preclusion. Hence, the federal courts should recognize the right of
state court litigants to withhold claims falling within exclusive federal
jurisdiction and should allow such claims to be asserted in the statutorily
preferred forum.
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